


**BUILDING MODERN SOCIETY IN THE
LIGHT OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY**

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
A. The Background of the Problem	1
B. The Sources	5
C. Theme and Method	6
D. The Goal of this Work	8
CHAPTER ONE	11
CIVIL SOCIETY AS A PART OF ETHICAL LIFE DISCOURSE: A GENERAL VIEW	
Introduction.....	11
1.1. <i>Sittlichkeit</i> in the Discourse of Civil Society.....	13
1.2. Civil Society: A General View	29
1.2.1. The Passage of Ethical Life: from Family to Civil Society	30
1.2.2. The Categories of Civil Society	33
1.2.2.1. The System of Needs and Work	33
1.2.2.2. The Administration of Justice: The System of Law	39
1.2.2.3. General Authority	43
1.3. Education (<i>Bildung</i>) as the Important Category of Hegel's Concept on Civil Society	45

CHAPTER TWO49

**THROUGH EDUCATION (*BILDUNG*) TOWARDS
SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY**

Introduction49

2.1. *Bildung* as the Living Moment of Civil's Society

Maturation50

2.1.1. Hegel's Concept of *Bildung* in Paragraph 187 of
Philosophy of Right50

2.1.2. *Bildung* as the Moment of Struggle within a Subject64

2.1.3. *Bildung* as the Moment of Growing Up71

2.2. Building Citizens as Educated People towards a Steady
Civil Society74

2.2.1. The Educated Man in Civil Society74

2.2.2. Civilians as Educated People: Conformity with
Universality78

2.2.3. *Bildung* as a Means of Social Integration82

CHAPTER THREE87

**PROPOSING SOME REFLECTIVE QUESTIONS
AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ON *BILDUNG*
AS THE IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF HEGEL'S
CONCEPT ON CIVIL SOCIETY**

Introduction87

3.1. The Necessity of *Bildung* in Hegel's Depiction of Civil
Society. A Summary87

3.2. The Question about the Outcasts in Hegel's Civil
Society93

3.2.1. The Questions of Immigration95

3.2.2. The Question of Poverty.....	100
3.3. Tentative Conclusion.....	104
3.3.1. <i>Bildung</i> as the Means of the Individual and Social Integration in History.....	104
3.3.2. <i>Bildung</i> as Human Reason’s Capability of Communication.....	106
3.3.3. Living in Society as a kind of Classroom of <i>Bildung</i> ..	107
BIBLIOGRAPHY	111
AUTHOR	117

INTRODUCTION

A. The Background of the Problem

The question of development in a transformational society arises in countries of the so – called 'Third World'¹ precisely as the moment in which Third World societies encounter the technical, intellectual, and even ideological phenomena attendant upon something we shall be pleased to call **modernity**. Specifically, I have concerns about modernity in Java, Indonesia. The western colonialism until the beginning of the nineteenth century had influenced Javanese people to the necessity of modernity. Yet, modernity in Java has faced traditional power of the Javanese culture and Moslem orthodoxy that force any

¹ As usual, countries that are still in a process of transformation are associated with the Third World. Despite the precise historical origins of the term "Third World" in the historical fact of non-aligned countries during the cold war, the third world countries are associated with the relatively poor countries mainly of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Generally, they are the countries that are in the process of development to increase economic efficiency, expand the nation's productive capacity and advance technology. All those indicate the necessary conditions towards development. Cfr. VICKY RANDALL and ROBIN THEOBALD, *Political Change and Underdevelopment. A Critical Introduction to Third World Politics, Second Edition* (New York: PALGRAVE, 1998), 32. Also, IAIN MCLEAN, *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 137 and 496.

progressive thought of modernity to compromise.² Javanese historical course, in fact, appears as a high tension between these two poles, i.e. passive resistant tradition – orthodoxy and active social development of modernity. Modernity in Java, nevertheless, is the history of the Javanese's understanding of development itself.

Generally, my focus of development is on that of individual and social structure to actualize the potential of human personality. The question of development, therefore, is concerned with the relationship of an individual and society. At this point, there emerges a social conflict of purpose or end to which society develops and attains an achievement of every step of social transformation.

A given society has been **there** with a set of tradition, way of life, religion, local wisdom or proverb, and authoritative persons; in sum its common life. Regarding to those social facts, a given society actually finds difficulty in achieving the necessary social transformation or in attaining a purpose or an end, which society discovers for itself when it encounters as well as chooses to embrace modernity. An inner conflict of society, then, inevitably ensues. This is

² For more on this, cfr. DENYS LOMBARD, *Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya. Warisan Kerajaan-kerajaan Konsentris. Buku 3*, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1996, 2000), 142 – 168.

actually the conflict between developmental modernization and historical – religious traditions. It is the conflict among the ethical power of purpose or of an end, too. Upon that ethical power, each of developmental modernization and historical – religious traditions leans their vision and understanding of reality ideologically towards a certain form of social life.

Modernity is, in fact, a growth within western civilization. Western society continues to experience the tension caused by the presence of a (more-or-less) developed modernity within the western civilizational context, which contains elements inherently resistant to the process of modernization.³ The case in Third World countries generally and in Indonesia specifically is rather different and, in many ways, more complex. The Third World countries generally encounter modernity as a highly developed complex of the social phenomena, the social and cultural sources of which are largely extraneous to the Third World societies. The conflict that arises within the Third World societies, therefore, is different in kind from the cultural conflict attendant upon a growth of modernity within the western civilizational milieu.

³ For more on modernity as a growth within western civilization, cfr. ERIC VOEGELIN, *The New Science of Politics: An Introduction*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952, 1987).

The question before us is: how do we resolve the conflict between developmental modernization and historical – religious traditions when such a conflict arises in a society in transformation? I submit that Hegel's conception of civil society as he articulates it in the *Elements of Philosophy of Right* is useful to anyone who would address this question.

Actually, Civil Society is the part of Hegel's text on the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. The text itself is divided into three parts, Family, Civil Society, and State. In the part of Civil Society, still we have three parts, namely, Abstract Right, Morality, and Ethical Life. Ethical Life, thus, is the last topic treated in the *Elements of Philosophy of Right* with which the main question of this book is concerned. In this part, education, culture, civilization, cultivation, or even transformation of society (translated from German word, *Bildung*) are considered as the important part of the discussion on how to be “ethical” in social life. Hegel considers that in order to be a modern society, *Bildung* is the inevitable process of educating people to become civilian. It means that no one must be an outcast, outsider, or marginalized in a certain society. Everyone is (and must be) the civilian, the integral part of community. *Bildung* is a German word which gives us an image or portrait of such a

social life. In the context of *The Elements of Philosophy of Right*, it is the word with amazing richness of meaning: education, cultururation, cultivation, portrait, building, civilization, and even transformation of social life. The purpose of *Bildung* is that any social life must be rational.

B. The Sources

Previously it has been mentioned that Civil Society in the *Elements of Philosophy of Right* is one of three sections of Hegel's discourse on Ethical Life. The two other sections are the Family and the State. My principal source of this book is Hegel's work on *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, translated by H.B. Nisbet, edited by Allen W. Wood, published in Cambridge by Cambridge University Press, 1991. For the second English translation, I consider *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, translated by Knox, T.M., published in London by Oxford University Press, 1952. Thanks to this second English translation, I have a kind of opportunity to consult any difficulty of getting the original sense in comparing one translation to the other because of my lack of German language.

Furthermore, I also rely on Charles Taylor's *Hegel and Modern Society*, published in Cambridge by Cambridge University Press, 1979.

C. Theme and Method

The title of this book is *Building Modern Society in the Light of Hegel's Philosophy*. Scrutinizing Hegel's philosophy on building modern society is not easy thing to do. If we expect to get some information of his concept on modern society and its development, the primary source which must be considered is his work on *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, which takes his special theme on *Bildung*. This German word actually has quite rich and vague meanings, one of which I have elaborated a lot as the title of my thesis, namely, education. To be noted well, since I started my study on modern philosophy at Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, Italy, I had been interested in Hegel's views on how to build modern society by proposing his concept on *Bildung*. In fact, this book is the remake and revision of my thesis which is entitled: "*Education (Bildung) as the important element of Hegel's Civil Society; an Analysis of paragraph 187 of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*". By proposing such a lengthy title, I shall proceed through a series of questions, which are:

1. How does Hegel come to propose *Bildung* as necessary to building a Civil Society? At first, this question leads me to observe in a general view how Hegel describes his notions of Civil Society in the discourse of Ethical Life (*Sittlichkeit*). Then, I expound the necessity of *Bildung* in Civil Society.
2. What does Hegel mean by *Bildung* in paragraph 187 of *Philosophy of Right*? Along with exploring the necessity of *Bildung* in paragraph 187, I would like to observe the necessity of *Bildung* in the context of building an integral Civil Society as the purpose of society itself. At stake in this part of the investigation is whether Hegel does, in fact, achieve a synthesis of his social theory and his philosophical system.
3. *Bildung* in Hegel's systematic concept is concerned with the actualization of human reason as the self-agent to take a part of Idea's self – actualization in an objective world. It is about human reason that acquires what is surrounding it in social circumstances. *Bildung*, therefore, is about the self-sufficiency of the concept itself in the form of human self-formation. Practically, the question of the way by which an institutional civil society comprehends and applies *Bildung* to its citizens, in fact, contains many social problems. The problem in

our epoch is the conflict between the necessity of *Bildung* in the recent form of modernization and the social fact of a multicultural society. If *Bildung* is to develop people in the form of modernization, how is it possible to practice *Bildung* among a multicultural people? In other words, how is it possible to comprehend *Bildung* in the recent social problem of global society whereby people is mixed culturally? Because the problem of global society also has born that of poverty, how is it possible to comprehend *Bildung* in the face of the problem of poverty? How can a certain society in transformation grasp all these social problems to step to redefine its purpose or end?

D. The Goal of this Work

It is civil society that is responsible for the education of citizens, for example, through a formal education or by providing a center for skill – training for youth. Civil society, in short, should make it possible for citizens to become self-sufficient persons in civil society. All these things are the advances that every citizen has the right to take up, at least, the minimum standard of life. All the advance of life in

INTRODUCTION

society is the proof of the social development towards modernization.

There remains, nevertheless, the conflict or incompatibility between the necessity of progressively social modernization and the resistance of the local – historical – religious traditions.

Thus, at the end of this work, I would like to study the philosophical – social implication of Hegel's thoughts of the necessity of *Bildung* in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* in paragraph 187. In fact, in many developed countries, social transformations through education (in the form of civil education) are still ongoing. There is, therefore, the need for a political and ethical theory to understand them.

CHAPTER ONE

CIVIL SOCIETY AS A PART OF ETHICAL LIFE DISCOURSE A General View

Introduction

Hegel's treatment of Civil Society is part of his larger discussion of Ethical Life. He treats Civil Society after the treatment of The Family and before discussion of The State. Hegel treats Ethical Life after the topic of Abstract Right and Morality. Ethical Life is the last topic treated in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*.

On the one hand, Civil Society consists of persons, who have their own end in the form of a totality of needs.⁴ Persons can gain and satisfy their end, however, only by entering into relations with other persons. This means that the bi-project of Civil Society is the construction of a forma of social life that is essentially different when an individual was entirely defined in terms of his obligations to others within society, which was the subsistent whole, of which,

⁴ Cfr, G.W.F. HEGEL, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, edited by Allen W. Wood, translated by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), § 182. In the next footnotes of this text, I will note simply in this way: P.R., 182.

individuals were mere indices. Civil Society is a realm in which individuals possess ends, which they achieve through the establishment of a new form of relation with one another. In Civil Society, each individual is concerned with achieving his own end. If we were to stop here, then, Civil Society would be a mere index of the sum of individuals constituting it. Hegel, however, insists that the end of society itself is not annihilated by the individual's discovery of himself as such, i.e. as a being with an end that is not reducible to that of society. In other words, even though the individual in Civil Society enters into relation with others only to achieve his own end, the relation which constitutes the form of Civil Society must be ordered to the end of society itself, which is not exhausted in the individuals' end. In other words, Hegel posits two principles of Civil Society: the individual with his totality of needs and society. The task of Civil Society, then, is to make the principles conform to one another. This task takes many profound discussions on Ethical Life.

It is inevitably through rational reflection that the two principles of an individual and society may be brought into conformity. Civil Society, therefore, becomes the realm of rational reflection on the ethical ends, because it is through rational reflection that an individual undertakes to

participate in and identify with a form of social life. Civil Society, thus, is the realm of reformulation or reflection of Ethical Life (*Sittlichkeit*).

The work of this chapter will conclude with a reflection on Hegel's concept of *Bildung*, which I translate as **self – education** and which constitutes to Hegel the central and guiding notion in his consideration of Civil Society. So, the work of this chapter will articulate a vision of ethical philosophy that is at once a theory of society. In sum, I am interested in using Hegel to set in relief the meeting – point of ethics and social science in relief.

1.1. *Sittlichkeit* in the Discourse of Civil Society

“Ethical Life is the *Idea of freedom* as the living good which has its knowledge and volition in self-consciousness, and its actuality through self-conscious action”.⁵ Following Hegel, Ethical Life is presupposed in the existential fact of society. Historically, human beings were driven to behave morally by the existential fact of the society in which they lived. It is in the factual society in which Ethical Life has a kind of ethical power for man. Charles Taylor, who engaged

⁵ P.R., 142.

in studying of Hegel, says the existence of society is the facts of the common life. He says, "The basis of my *sittlich* obligation is already there in existence."⁶ Accordingly, Robert C. Solomon, who also engaged in studying *Phenomenology of Spirit*, speaks of society as what has been **there**, as the social facts of the set of values in society. Solomon asserts, "Since a person is defined by his or her upbringing and place in society, the individual and individual pleasures and interests are themselves determined by the society."⁷ It is custom by which and in which social practices and relation among people in society take place; and in custom too there exists a certain categorical norm of human behaviour, an ethics.⁸

Sittlichkeit in Civil Society, then, is concerned with what has been there, which is experienced by people as the way of life in a certain form of social life. We can distinguish the appearance of *Sittlichkeit* in two ways.

Firstly, it is the practical side of a set of human practical actions in its group or society. Charles Taylor describes this aspect of Ethical Life as "the moral

⁶ CHARLES TAYLOR, *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1998), 83

⁷ ROBERT C. SOLOMON, *In the Spirit of Hegel* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 537.

⁸ For more on this, cfr. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, *A Short History of Ethics* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 193.

obligations I have to an ongoing community of which I am a part.”⁹ Moreover, “these obligations are based on established norms and uses.” These moral obligations might be the ethical substance that has a concrete historical character that is alive in a certain community or society insofar as it establishes the general mode of behaviour.

Sittlichkeit, then, is also concerned with a conscious experience of customary morality, when customary morality refers simultaneously to a system of social institutions and to the moral attitude of an individual who identifies with them. In other words, *Sittlichkeit* is an established custom, by which and in which someone identifies and lives in his certain society.¹⁰ Thanks to the identification of individuals with a certain society in the form of customs, then, a society or any social institution, in fact, arises, functions, or perpetuates itself.¹¹ In addition, Hegel says in *Philosophy of Right*, “In habit, the opposition between the natural and the subjective will disappears, and the resistance of the subject

⁹ CHARLES TAYLOR, *Op.Cit.*, 83.

¹⁰ Hegel argues that in the Ethical Life (*das Sittliche*), our attention is attracted to the close connection between individual ethical norms and social customs (*Sitte*). It means that it is custom, by which and in which individuals identify themselves with a certain form of social life. Cfr. P.R., 151.

¹¹ Cfr. ALLEN W. WOOD, *Hegel's Ethical Thought*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 197.

is broken.”¹² In other words, individuals are simply defined by the social group. They belong to a certain form of social life.

It is in ancient Greece that the individual's identification with a certain form of social life is achieved in the perfect unity of man and *Polis*. In the *Politics*, for example, Aristotle says, “Man is by nature a political animal. He, who is without a *Polis*, by reason of his own nature and not of some accident, is either a poor sort of being or a being higher than man.”¹³ In the world of the *Polis*, society was necessary for man to be fully human, because it was only in a *Polis* that man could live both the good life in any full sense,¹⁴ and society had the function of serving the end of man.¹⁵ In *Politics*, Aristotle emphasizes the unity between the necessity of living in society and Ethical Life in the form of the way of life or the common norms. Still in *Politics*, Aristotle says, “A city (*Polis*) is good in virtue of the goodness of the citizens.”¹⁶ And, he adds, “There are three

¹² P.R., 151.

¹³ ARISTOTLE, *Politics*, translated by Ernest Barker, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1253a2.

¹⁴ Cfr. *Idem*.

¹⁵ Cfr. ARISTOTLE, *Op.Cit.*, 1252a1.

¹⁶ ARISTOTLE, *Op.Cit.*, 1332a28.

means by which individuals become good and virtuous. These three are nature, habit, and reason.”¹⁷

Now, therefore, I would like to underline again the existence of society as the real-factual common life in discussing *Sittlichkeit*. But, it is important to note that this *Sittlichkeit* is not a set of principles. It is the consciousness of morality as what is customary. In a sense, *Sittlichkeit* as what is customary is what is there in a certain form of social life.

It is possible for *Sittlichkeit* to appear as a set of divine laws governing human action. Such a law is accepted by a society as unwritten and infallible. According to Hegel, “the *relationship* of self-consciousness to them is equally simple and clear. They *are*, and nothing more. This is what constitutes the awareness of its relationship to them.”¹⁸ That relationship, in fact, is concerned with formulating reflections and beliefs about what is absolute and sacred, insofar as the individuals must take the absolute and sacred object as an absolute base for their life. It is the idea of religion in which representational thought works in terms of symbols, stories and rites. Religion, in this sense, “gives us a

¹⁷ ARISTOTLE, *Op.Cit.*, 1332a38.

¹⁸ G.W.F. HEGEL, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A.V. Miller, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), paragraph 437, page 261. In the next footnotes, I would simply note it in this way: P.S. 437, 261.

self-reflection through various symbols and stories, not through conceptually articulated theories.”¹⁹

Although *Sittlichkeit* is in a customary and immediate form, it is an ethical sphere which has an ethical power which actually governs the lives of individuals, because it is also believed as a living good. By saying that *Sittlichkeit* is the living good, we mean to say that there is a notion that permits the affirmations of common good as social norms by grounding those affirmations in the practices of society itself. It nonetheless also has constituted people's rationality to live in the guidance of what is ethical as a common norm, as a system of social institutions.²⁰ All those moments of ethical life constitute what is rational because they are not something alien to the subject. Hegel admits that, even in what is naturally religious, the substantial element considered sacred by individuals is also “endowed with consciousness, although the status of the latter is always only that of a moment.”²¹ There are genuine developments

¹⁹ TERRY PINKARD, *Hegel's Phenomenology, The Sociality of Reason*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 223.

²⁰ Cfr. P.R., 144-145.

²¹ P.R., 144

of thought that can only proceed in such a representational form, and religious thought is one of them.²²

Now, the living subject requires the freedom to ground all those objective ethical principles (in the form of *Sittlichkeit*) on reason. It is a process of internalizing what is external in the common norms of ethics, so that they are his own.²³

In regard to that internalization, there is, therefore, in Ethical Life something that we might call tentatively a twofold movement: toward the objective and at the same time toward the subjective.²⁴

Allen W. Wood has discussed this twofold movement in the following terms: “Ethical life has both its *objective* side, in the form of a *present world* or social order, and

²² It is possible because in any religious thought “faith and trust arise with the emergence of reflection, and they presuppose representations and distinctions.” Further reflection, then, is intended as the insight grounded on reasons. Cfr. P.R., 147.

²³ Cfr. P.R., 106 – 107.

²⁴ When Hegel asserts that living good “has its knowledge and volition in self-consciousness”, it points to this subjective order, namely, the content of what is good that is known and willed by subject through an action in a certain form. Any practical subjective action, for example, means actualizing and making what is good in the formal abstract form become known, determined, existential, and actually present. A series of human actions, therefore, now, becomes a kind of place where an abstract good comes into the objective sphere of ethics itself. In this sense, subjectivity is the moment of the actuality of Ethical Life. Cfr. P.R., 141.

its *subjective side*, in the self-consciousness of individuals.”²⁵ Further, “The objective side of ethical life is the *substance* of the individuals who belong to the ethical order”²⁶ whereas the subjective side, the self-consciousness of individuals, is at the same time their consciousness of this substance”.²⁷ In relation to the subject, moreover, the ethical substance could also appear as the *supreme* “more firmly based than the *being of nature*”²⁸ in as much as laws and powers guiding or governing a certain formal human action in its society or group.

In that twofold movement of the process of internalization, therefore, there are, as it were, two parts in a subject who is reflecting an ethical substance. The reflecting subject is, now, in opposition between what is good as something internal in itself, and what is both as an ethical substance and as an existent world or something external. Nevertheless, it is not alien to him since it is the part of his consciousness.²⁹ Subjectivity of the will must reflect on and mediate all the immediate and given ethical substance.

²⁵ ALLEN W. WOOD, *Op.Cit.*, 196. The italic is mine. For the reference of the objective side of Ethical Life, cfr. P.R., 144 – 145; and of the subjective side, P.R., 146 – 147.

²⁶ Cfr. P.R., 144.

²⁷ ALLEN W. WOOD, *Op.Cit.*

²⁸ P.R., 146.

²⁹ Cfr. P.R., 33 and 147.

Our question, now, is: When will a reflective and rational consideration begin? Further, once it begins, when does it come into opposition with a ground of the Ethical Life (*Sittlichkeit*) which has claimed itself as the universal, governing people in their practice in its space and time in circumstances? It happens when norms, beliefs, customs, etc., have been put in question by the individuals, or by the power of thought. Consequently, there is a moment in which man's identification with his form of social life breaks. In other words, in a larger sphere, men might cease to identify with the community's life.

This is the critical moment, in which individuals in a certain society or group are compelled by their reason to redefine what is central for them. Thought has an inherent tendency not to be confined by any particular habit, practice, or symbol.³⁰ Because the power of thought is dynamic, self-transcendent, and fundamentally dialectical, questions on ethical substance (for example, in the form of a given order) are unavoidable and every action will eventually lose its ethical basis. The harmony in ancient Greek *Polis* between an individual's end and that of society

³⁰ Instead of Kant's argument that human reason attempts to extend cognition beyond the bounds of possible experience that consequently makes unwarranted claims to knowledge, Hegel retains that our thinking has an inherent tendency to go beyond every limit. Cfr. ALLEN W. WOOD 1990, *Op.Cit.*, 2.

eventually broke and questions of redefining the end (*telos*) itself arose.³¹

Now, if we take into account *Sittlichkeit* as a set practice, for instance in the form of custom or habit, this breaking-up-moment of ancient Greek harmony needs something beyond *Sittlichkeit*. Hegel, in *Philosophy of Right*, takes Plato's *Republic* as an example of the failure of describing an ideal society, which invokes the need of redefining the end (*telos*) between individuals and society.

Now, I would like to take a moment to observe how Hegel criticizes Plato's *Republic*. Hegel says *Republic* lacks the important thing that Hegel puts forward for the ideal society. We know that Plato directs his notion of ethics towards the attainment of man's highest good, in possession of which true happiness consists. A subject achieves happiness through the pursuit of virtue. For Plato, virtue is identical with knowledge. And knowledge for Plato has the Good as the unique notion that is distinguished from all others. Since Plato says, "The realm of the visible should be

³¹ Hegel puts forward the societies of the world in the past, which were based on the patriarchal and religious principle, or another simple principle of ethics. Those societies of the ancient world, according to Hegel, were based merely on the natural intuition, so that, when the demands of redefining men's end in the form of rationality had come, those societies lost its very principle basis to serve the end of man to happiness. Cfr. P.R., 185.

compared to prison dwelling”³², in order to get the truth of any object of knowledge, everything that is particularly good must in a particular way be understood to be so in reference to the Form of the Good. More than this, knowledge consists in understanding the relation of a particular good to the Form of the Good, i.e. in the ability to say how and why a particular good is good; how it reflects to the Good. It is the Form of Good as a single and unitary notion like a light which enlightens our sight to see any object of *the* good of being. Moreover, Plato says, “In the visible world, the Form of Good is both light and the fount of light.”³³ So, knowing, apprehending, and pursuing what comes from and is relevant with that Form of Good is virtue and this results in wisdom.

Plato’s description of society is apt to his notion of the unique Form of Good. Plato wants to spread out an ideal State in such a way that that society is a perfect model for who wishes to look upon it and, then, sets up the perfect society.³⁴

³² PLATO, *Republic*, 517b, in: *Classics of Moral and Political Theory*, edited by Michael L. Morgan, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992), 161. In the following footnotes, I would simply note it in this way: *Republic*, 517b, 161.

³³ PLATO, *Op.Cit.*, 517b, 161.

³⁴ Plato says, “I understand, he said, you mean in the city which we were founding and described, our city of words, for I do not believe it exists

In Plato's ideal State, there are three great classes. There is the artisan class with its associated virtue of temperance. There are the Auxiliaries or military class with courage and fortitude over the artisans. Finally, there is the class of Guardians, which are at the top of wisdom, that is, possessing true knowledge for the good of man (it means also that it is the class of philosophers).

Hegel criticizes Plato's appointment of individuals to their particular classes, his assigning them to certain social roles according to their particular class. For example, in Plato's *Republic*, on behalf of the common interest, namely, of the city itself, the class of Guardians and Auxiliaries may not hold private property, nor may they marry. They will live merely under the care of the State because their life is totally dedicated to the State. Contrarily, private property and family in Hegel's concept of Civil Society are the arbitrary will of individuals and their choice of a social position.³⁵

Plato's notion of building a stable and steady society in *Republic* is completely in opposition to Hegel's

anywhere on earth. Perhaps, I said, it is a model laid up in heaven, for him who wishes to look upon, and as he looks, set up the government of his soul. It makes no difference whether it exists anywhere or will exist." See, PLATO, *Op.Cit.*, 592b.

³⁵ P.R., 185.

understanding of Civil Society. In Hegel's view, *Republic* eliminates the two principles of Civil Society itself. According to Hegel, Plato's *Republic* presents "the substance of ethical life in its ideal *beauty* and *truth*, but it cannot come to terms with the principle of self-sufficiency particularity."³⁶ For the annulment of a subjective freedom and strict reduction of individuals under control by the State in Plato's *Republic* shows the separated or split existence of particularity (citizens) and universality (State). If it is so, there is no transformation into one another. If there is no particularity in opposition to universality, universality would have no way of realizing itself.

In addition, if citizens lacked the principle of self-sufficiency, they could not define their identity. Their existence in society would not be recognized and known legally. They would not be free. The lack of self-sufficiency in Plato's *Republic* results in what Hegel calls ethical corruption. It is the ultimate reason for the downfall of the states of the ancient world, because the principles of Civil Society are regarded with the self-sufficiency of particularity and honour among its individual members, which comes from that self-sufficiency.³⁷

³⁶ P.R., 185.

³⁷ Cfr. P.R., 245.

This understanding of the necessity of individual self-sufficiency in Civil Society leads us to see the necessity of something beyond *Sittlichkeit* as we have discussed it up to this point. The other side of the breaking-up-moment is the redefinition of the relation between the individual and his society. From this point, every individual is called to become a rational moral agent. A rational moral agent is a subject who is capable of reflecting critically on his social and historical situation.

Thus, it is Morality that comes to the realm of Ethical Life, and both are interwoven or interpenetrated in the form of personal as well as social life. We know that Hegel makes a distinction between Morality (*Moralität*) and Ethical Life (*Sittlichkeit*).³⁸ Hegel says, “Ethical life is the *Idea of freedom* as the living good which has its knowledge and volition in self-consciousness, and its actuality through self-conscious action”.³⁹ Hegel’s treatment of Ethical Life, then, leads to a discussion of freedom. The kind of freedom Hegel is at pains to discuss, however, is not in *status quo*. The Idea of freedom Ethical Life is one of passing from consciousness of customary morality to reflective morality.

³⁸ Cfr. P.R., 33.

³⁹ See, P.R., 142.

Freedom, further, is a part of the development of the Idea of the will to become free in and for itself. What kind of freedom is this?

In saying that freedom is a part of the development of the Idea of the will, I mean that Hegel conceives Morality as the will is developing to become the **subjective** will. Each individual has an ethical end, which guides and informs him to affirm and do what is good. But it is still what is good that is affirmed by any social conditions surrounding him. In other words, the good is still immediately given. It is also the will to pursue the Ethical Life without any further reflection that must be done by subject. What is affirmed as good is still merely prescribed and dictated, for instance, by God, or by the social system in the form of traditions and customs⁴⁰; it is known by an individual immediately. If an individual affirms what is good, for instance, his affirmation still belongs to the immediate will. If he or she did or did not do it, his social conditions would judge him/her as doing what was good or bad, right or wrong. There is not yet the freedom of will, since it is still grounded by immediacy, irrationality, and

⁴⁰ To do what is dictated and prescribed to be virtuous, in a sense, is easy. In an ethical community that follows an order as what is merely given, dictated, and prescribed, for instance, there is not yet a distinction between what someone *must* do and what the duties *are*. Cfr. P.R., 150.

naturalness. The freedom of will must be grounded on subjectivity.⁴¹

Further, even though those practises of Ethical Life have the powers of governing individual behaviour in as much as they **are**, they are still in the objective form. As the objective form, those absolute and sacred things in a natural religion are not yet known. So, even though in a religious sphere they are considered as the absolute, the eternal, the sacred values, they are still outside the realm of subjective self-reflection.

Because human reason is free, a rational subject sees that there is a gap between what he **thinks** he is doing and what he is **really** doing. It is rational consciousness which guides a subject to be free to obey only the dictate of his own will because human reason by its universal freedom must rebel against everything merely given.⁴² The question of freedom, now, is concerned with the critical moment in which the power of reason penetrates *Sittlichkeit*. Thanks to this process of rational reflection, the abstract concept of a given order, for example, becomes understood, known, and determined. *Sittlichkeit*, now, is actualized in the form of the new set of the rational social order in the same society by

⁴¹ Cfr. P.R., 106 – 107.

⁴² Cfr. P.R., 105 – 107, 150. CHARLES TAYLOR, *Op.Cit.*, 76 – 77.

the cultivated individual, who is the subjective agent of morality. Thus, society becomes characterized by a new rational standard through the subjective agent.

According to Charles Taylor, Hegel's achievement lies in uniting the Kantian radical notion of autonomy and the expressive unity of living in society referring to Greek *Polis*.⁴³ In insisting that moral life reaches its highest realization in *Sittlichkeit* and it requires society, Hegel follows Aristotle's conception of living in *Polis* to reach happiness as the human end. Meanwhile, Kant's giving preference to rational-radical autonomy has inspired Hegel to the freedom of subjectivity of the will. Hegel decides, however, not to choose Aristotle's way of merely living in *Polis* without individual freedom, nor Kant's purely formal morality without being accessible to any relationship of social life. Hegel, instead, takes up both, and tries to synthesis them.

1.2. Civil Society: A General View

The concept that underlies that critical passage is that of the internal subdividing Spirit, of the scientific

⁴³ Cfr. CHARLES TAYLOR, *Hegel*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 374 and 388. Cfr. Also CHARLES TAYLOR, *Hegel and Modern Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1998), 82 and 84.

development of Idea, being out of itself in its breaking-up-moment in its internal opposition.⁴⁴ Regarding the family, that concept underlies the notion of Civil Society as actually the process of conforming *Sittlichkeit* (for example, an ethical order that individuals have been educated in family) with its redefinition through positing itself. The process is that of rational reflection. That is the process of becoming existent and real what is still conceptual and abstract in the former level. Only through this moment, that is, the moment of internal breaking-up in the form of internal opposition can “abstract thinking attain actuality and ethical objectivity.”⁴⁵ It is, thus, the process of growing up internally.

1.2.1. The Passage of Ethical Life: From Family to Civil Society

Actually, when individuals of family come into Civil Society, it occurs that “the immediate unity of the family has disintegrated into plurality”.⁴⁶ Coming into society, every person of a family is drawn out from the family to become a self-sufficient person, because it is self-sufficiency that is

⁴⁴ Cfr. P.R., 32 – 33.

⁴⁵ P.R., 207.

⁴⁶ P.R., 184.

required by the reality of Civil Society for every citizen. An individual in Civil Society faces more complex social relations and orders than the child in the family. This passage from family to Civil Society is also the moment for an individual to place all of his behaviours in a more rational – social way than every ethical tie that binds every member of a family, which is natural, immediate, and given. Instead of an individual's existence in a family, in which there could be no clear distinctions of what one **ought to** do and what one **is**, in society there must be a number of social orders that are more or less systematically and legally defined, and which drive all its members' behaviour. Hence, Hegel called the self-sufficient person of Civil Society torn away from his family as a son of Civil Society.⁴⁷

This passage from Ethical Life, therefore, concerns also the passage from natural simplicity or the immediate to the reflected and mediated, or from the natural ethical or merely given order to the rational one. In the case of the individual's passage from his family to Civil Society, it is concerned with the process of institutionalizing norms into Civil Society.

Now, in coming into Civil Society, an individual faces the problem that was not in the family, namely, that

⁴⁷ Cfr. P.R., 238.

what **is** and what **ought** to be.⁴⁸ In coming into Civil Society, there emerges “the distance between *private* and *public* that is to be mediated, if we understand the former as the vanishing point where the social integration of the family is dissolved before the mediations characteristic of Civil Society begin”.⁴⁹ Further, an individual entering into Civil Society must also face the social fact of the public authority that has the right to legislate, codify, and engage in public administration to manage all the persons and properties in Civil Society. In the passage of Ethical Life from Family to Civil Society, thus, *Sittlichkeit* is on the level in which the oppositions of ought and is, right and duty, subject and object, even what is rational and what is actual, appear in the very public realm.⁵⁰

Concretely, in Hegel’s Civil Society, all antinomies and tensions in every moment of civilizing society or institutionalizing norms exist in the public sphere. It requires a great deal of effort to unite all the oppositions in the public realm, to redefine people’s identification with a certain form of social life at a higher level. Hegel’s

⁴⁸ Hegel says, “In the ethical realm (of family), a human being has rights in so far as he has duties, and duties in so far as he has rights.” See, P.R., 155.

⁴⁹ JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW ARATO, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, London: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992, 1999), 96.

⁵⁰ Cfr. JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW ARATO, *Op.Cit.*, 95.

description of Civil Society spreads out those oppositions to become equilibrated between man and his needs, and between human consciousness and nature.⁵¹ In Hegel's terms, Civil Society is that in which "the Idea has lost itself in particularity and split up into the division between inward and outward."⁵² It is now up to us to see how dynamic Civil Society is in its **worldly interpretation** of Idea in the real life of its citizens.

1.2.2. The categories of Civil Society

1.2.2.1. The System of Needs and Work

The system of needs is the first instance of Civil Society because, according to Hegel, regarding to its first principle, Civil Society is constituted by a particular person with a totality of needs, and it is through work he attains the satisfaction of these needs.⁵³ The subject of Civil Society is concretely he who has subjective needs from the complex of natural necessity and arbitrary will. A man, however, is not like the other creatures in the way he satisfies his needs.

⁵¹ Cfr. P.R., 194. Also cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, *Hegel's Theory of The Modern State*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972),145

⁵² P.R., 229. Also cfr. P.R., 33.

⁵³ Cfr. P.R., 182, 189.

As a rational being, a man may judge among means to his needs. This is, moreover, a rational process or abstraction of needs by a process of multiplying needs and means. The multiplication of needs and means, then, is a consequence of dividing and differentiating more particular needs into individual parts and aspects. This is a characteristic of modern Civil Society.⁵⁴

Satisfying needs and choosing means (by which those needs will be satisfied optimally) are two relational aspects that emerge in Civil Society. They are the relation with subject himself internally and with others externally.⁵⁵

In relation to himself, satisfying needs through the mediation of work by a subject is actually a process of objectifying needs. Since the human subject is rational, man gives a rational value to both, based on his needs and his mediating work to satisfy them. In creating any product as the result of certain works, for example, there is always a

⁵⁴ In paragraph 201 of *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel asserts what he means of the more complex development of civil society. "... The whole complex evolves into *particular systems* of needs, with their corresponding means, varieties of work, modes of satisfaction, and theoretical and practical education." And, further, from this increasing of the varieties of needs, Hegel divided society in class system based on their particular capacities of their possibility of skill and education contribution to the society, shown in the following articles: substantial or immediate estate, the reflecting or formal estate, and the *universal* estate. P.R., 201.

⁵⁵ It is in fact regarding with the two principles on which civil society is based on. Cfr. P.R., 182.

rational subjective value. Work, then, creates “the feeling of right, integrity, and honour which comes from supporting oneself by one’s own activity and work”.⁵⁶

In the result of work, then, there is a kind of representation of a subjective rational process on appropriate values. Since, after any period of work, the result of satisfied needs is property, property has the value of subjective possession. Or, in other words, in possessing a certain property as a result of subjective work, there is the identification of subject with objective property.⁵⁷ This bears an inter-connected correlation between needs, work, and property as the result of subjective work. Whoever consumes a human product, consumes human rational effort in the form of work.⁵⁸ Regarding the subjective work and the identification of subject with the result of that work (in the form of properties) through a process of rational valuing, the subject in possession of property makes that property become, in a sense, the part of the subject itself. The subject in possession of a property as the result of his work, then, is distinctive and unique.

⁵⁶ See P.R., 244. In Hegelian civil society context, these values of human work are very important, without which, in the unfortunate conditions of poverty, the poor are burdened by external distress, because they are unskilled, uneducated, and then incapable to share to the universal resources of civil society.

⁵⁷ For example, *my house, my car, my computer*, etc.

⁵⁸ Cfr. P.R.,196.

The inter-connected correlation between needs, work, and property as the result of subjective work, what we have observed above, is in fact about the actualization of human reason itself in the subjective sphere. In the concrete objective sphere, since a society requires the completion of the moral life of every individual in living among the others, every particular subjective work to satisfy needs must be commensurable with all others in society. It is therefore concerned with the subjective will in a private sphere in its correlation with the general will of the public sphere. In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel says,

“The selfish end in its actualization, conditioned in this way by universality, establishes a system of all-round interdependence, so that the subsistence and welfare of the individual and his rightful existence are interwoven with, and grounded on, the subsistence, welfare, and rights of all, and have actuality and security only in this context.”⁵⁹

So, we are now in another aspect of satisfying individual needs, namely, in relation with others in society. This interconnection evokes any invention of means to satisfy people's needs in society as the endless rational process in Civil Society. The invented means also emerges

⁵⁹ P.R., 183.

in the form of multiplication of needs and work in the linked form of social life.

Needs, work, and property must, therefore, have a social character. They bear an inter-dependency to secure and to keep society in equilibrium between its two principles. According to Hegel, every member of Civil Society is capable of sharing a “contribution towards the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else”.⁶⁰ Civil Society becomes, then, that which grows on the basis of economic and developmental policy. Such a society, therefore, must have the capability of economic self – regulation or management. In short, it must be capable of political economy, especially in the form of a self – regulating market.⁶¹

Subsequently, there emerge two excesses of that mode of economic social integration: the universal and permanent resources on the one hand, and people’s skills as individual’s possibility of sharing in the universal resources on the other hand. Individual skill is also correlated with education. Moreover, there is also the reality of the inequalities of people’s skill and education because all would attain their livelihood and welfare as the proper end “whose

⁶⁰ P.R., 199.

⁶¹ Cfr. JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW ARATO, *Op.Cit.*, 98.

actualization is conditioned by the individual's own arbitrary will and particular nature".⁶²

In this economical system, there would also be the problem of how to conform and balance the individual participation in the form of sharing economic resources through education and skills, on the one hand, and the society's need for the universal and permanent resources of society on the other. The demand for conformity and equilibrium is necessary in the light of the real – social fact that not all citizens have the same possibility of sharing universal and permanent resources. There are, after all, inequalities of skill and limits of individuals' abilities to benefit from education.

From this point, Hegel develops a system for Civil Society, which is based on the system of law that will guarantee and secure that economic system legally (admitted by any valid law). In other words, there should be a legal system in which such a system could guarantee and secure the two principles of Civil Society that we have seen previously.

⁶² P.R., 230.

1.2.2.2. The Administration of Justice: The System of Law

Hegel proposes many detail points on The Administration of Justice in his *Philosophy of Right*, but, here I would simply emphasize some points concerned with the process of making the interdependency of the two principles of Civil Society legal and valid. It is precisely Civil Society with its system of positive laws in the codified, legislative, and administrative form that is the rational product of the modern human action.

Hegel asserts, “When what is right *in itself* is *posited* in its objective existence, it becomes *law*, and through this determination, right becomes positive in general.”⁶³ In Hegel’s vocabulary, being posited means objectifying, determining by thought in such a way that what is posited can be affirmed and known explicitly.⁶⁴ Positing abstract rights means, therefore, bringing out subjective and private individual rights, and then raising them up to the level of being recognized by others actually and legally. This is the institutionalization of abstract right. Law, in fact, is that in which the subjective, particular, and private right becomes

⁶³ P.R., 221.

⁶⁴ Cfr. MICHAEL INWOOD, *A Hegel Dictionary*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 224-226.

objective, universal, and known by another in the social sphere. It is the passage from the private sphere to the public one.

A means by which subjective-private rights become positive law is codification. Every process of codification actually should begin through a reflection of an internal subjective right, because in being codified, an abstract and subjective right finds its determination in being known and recognised by others. This is a rational process. It is actually the process of positive law. “Only when it (right) becomes law does what is right take on both the *form* of its universality and its true determinacy.”⁶⁵ Positive law, thus, is the determinative form of abstract and subjective right. By its positive dimension, right is actualized, measured, and communicable, in its social inter-subjective relation.

In other words, the positive law is a systematization of right under the specific form of codification. Codified right, then, can be known, and only as such can it have any validity in a certain society. Because every person in Civil Society should be legal, thus, every property and personality has legal recognition and validity in Civil Society by the process of codification of abstract rights.⁶⁶ In a sense, Hegel

⁶⁵ P.R., 211.

⁶⁶ P.R., 218.

characterizes the positive law as a confining term between the private and public sphere, or an individual and society.⁶⁷ Consequently, there could be actually a great confusion of private and public sphere in the optimal point of positive law. But, it is really the essence of Civil Society itself regarding its difference from the family, in which, the familiar relation loses and all the relations constitute “the world of appearance of the ethical”.⁶⁸

The rational passage in modern society that posits subjective right and the entire private world in positive law, in fact, is that which there was not in the antique society, or, what Hegel calls societies which “were based on original natural intuition”.⁶⁹ Positive law, therefore, is supposed to be an achievement and rational-reflective product of the modern human action in society. In other words, being different from the antique societies whose standards to attain the equilibrated relationship between the ends of people and that of society were merely given, immediate, and un-reflected, positive law as the rational-reflective product of the human subject in modern society is the achievement of modernity itself. This achievement is also

⁶⁷ Cfr. P.R., 211 – 213. Also cfr. JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW ARATO, *Op.Cit.*, 95.

⁶⁸ P.R., 181.

⁶⁹ P.R., 185.

marked by the fact that abstract and individual right, in being posited and known, attains its true determinacy in which “all the contingencies of feeling and opinions and the forms of revenge, compassions, and selfishness fall away.”⁷⁰ Thus, in modern society, an individual’s existence and participation in Civil Society is guaranteed and secured by positive law.⁷¹

I have shown previously that the administration of justice in the form of positive law as the system that aims at guaranteeing and securing the two principles of Civil Society in its wholly interdependency’s form. Also, in Civil Society, needs, work as the means to satisfy needs, and property as the result of work, are linked. The positive law function of legislating and validating, therefore, should encompass its function of guaranteeing and securing them all, including the people’s possibility of accessing education and skills towards their sharing in the universal resources.⁷²

I think, regarding the function of positive legislation to guarantee and secure the linked needs, work, and property of Civil Society, all the external and social relationships which are lawful, must appear and be revealed

⁷⁰ P.R., in addition to paragraph 211.

⁷¹ Cfr. P.R., 217.

⁷² Cfr. P.R., 200, 237 – 239.

as the object of legislation to be known and recognized by the valid law. In other words, only in the validly posited law can right be known and recognized legally.⁷³ But he asserts immediately the necessity of clarifying the positivist problem concerning with morality and the moral precepts for not being able to be matters for a positive legislation. “Only those aspects which are by nature capable of having an external dimension can become the object of legislation.”⁷⁴

Our problem now is: who will be responsible for the just and right application of valid law in order to guarantee the legislation, which properly interconnects the two principles of Civil Society? How do such valid laws have a binding force on every person towards equilibrating the two principles of Civil Society? Those questions, actually, lead us to discuss the administration of justice by public authority.

1.2.2.3. General Authority

It is the system of justice that maintains the equilibrium of that economic chain and the interconnection of every economic element of Civil Society. And, further, it is the public – general authority that keeps the maintenance

⁷³ Cfr. P.R., 212 – 213.

⁷⁴ Addition to P.R. 213.

of that system of justice to be done and run well by every member of Civil Society. It has also an oversight control and advance provision of the universal functions and arrangements of public utilities.⁷⁵ A professional judge, for example, is the organ of the law and, then, he must be capable of knowing any case that disturbs the universal system of Civil Society⁷⁶, as well as of categorizing it in the codification of law. This means he must be capable of linking the particular cases and empirical proofs with the legal and political institutions as the rational character of Civil Society.⁷⁷

The general – public authority also guarantees that the subject of Civil Society is, without exception, a client of general authority and an association member. It is about the safeguarding and oversight procedure on behalf of security – not only on persons and property of every member of

⁷⁵ Cfr. P.R., 226. In this paragraph, Hegel refers the task of professional judge to “the supervision of the whole course of the inquiry, and the legal actions between parties”. Further, a judge must also supervise the application of law including its dispensation to particular cases. So, also cfr., P.R., 225.

⁷⁶ In saying of cases that disturb the universal system of civil society, I refer to what Hegel says of crime and punishment. According to Hegel, crime is considered as an injury of one member of civil society that, in its turn, is also an injury to all others. Because everyone in civil society has his right to express his private life in taking part in social sphere, in being criminal, therefore, someone has injured this expression of taking part in social life. This invokes a legalization of punishment as the reconciliation of criminals with his right and that of his certain society. Cfr. P.R., 218, 220.

⁷⁷ Cfr. P.R., 219, 226 – 227.

Civil Society, but also their guaranteed livelihood and welfare.⁷⁸ Regarding the economic chain in the form of interconnection, for example, public authorities must maintain that interconnection in which the business of one is at the same time carrying out that on behalf of all others in the linked market economy. In this sense, public authority functions as providing the universal aspect of Civil Society for calling upon all particular aspects of any dimensions of people's lives.

Public authority, thus, is aimed at safeguarding Civil Society based on a system and it should be ready to *re-establish* itself if there was any collision opposing it.

1.3. Education (*Bildung*) as the important Category of Hegel's Concept on Civil Society

Here, I would like to repeat what I have observed on what Hegel emphasizes on Civil Society in *Philosophy of Right*. They are the two principles of Civil Society in paragraph 182 of *Philosophy of Right*. All of what Hegel wants to describe Civil Society is in this contradiction and at the same time conformity between a particular person who has

⁷⁸ Cfr. P.R., 221.

his own end as a totality of needs and a mixture of natural necessity and arbitrariness, and the fact that at the same time he can accomplish his own ends only through the others in Civil Society, or in Hegel's terms, through the mediation of the form of universality. This contradiction between the individual ends and that of society is at the same time a motor by which Civil Society moves and grows up.⁷⁹

To understand this kind of contradiction between the individual end and that of society, natural intuitions as the principle of some antique societies are not adequate principles for underlying the self-movement of society itself.⁸⁰ Hegel, therefore, takes Civil Society's need for self-sufficiency both of particularity and of universality that must be bound up and conditioned by each other in the linked economic interconnection.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Cfr. CHARLES TAYLOR, *Op.Cit.*, 46.

⁸⁰ Cfr. P.R., 185.

⁸¹ The inner ethical corruption could happen in society based on merely natural intuition and, worse than never, it makes individuals in it be only mass, or crowd without identity and right guaranteed by positive law, or society be mere collective individuals. So, the individual attains actuality only by entering into existence and having to be conscious of himself as engaged in activities whose objective worth is recognized by others. In other word, subject actuality is gained by being linked with the universality of continuum. The *continuum* word will be expounded in the second chapter. Cfr. ALLEN W. WOOD, *Op.Cit.*, 241. Cfr. Also P.R., 184 and 207.

Further, to understand this kind of contradiction that is at the same time a motor of the self-movement of Civil Society, we need to understand the movement of rationality itself. The portrait of modern Civil Society must be that of a cultural society which is based on the process of human reason. It should not be based on a merely natural ethical principle which underlies society to satisfy the individual end and that of society through merely a common life or a given social order, but, rather, it is a modern society as the more and more rational one, in which there must be a reflective historical process of Ethical Life itself.

Now, all categories or characters of such a society are born from society itself. Social facts are the immediate prescriptions of the given or the simple and natural Ethical Life.⁸² Instead, society is described in itself and by itself. Hence, Civil Society is the very real and objective moment of Ethical Life itself, in and by which the Idea is constituted to become its reality. It is properly the Hegelian vision of society. Society, thus, is a product of a human rational culture in its progressive process towards its maturity.

⁸² Shortly, Hegel thinks of the society based on original natural intuition which could be considered as the prescribed society by such natural intuition. This *natural* word will be the important word used as the opponent of education or *Bildung*, which will be expounded in the following chapter. Cfr. P.R., 185.

Again, it is culturally and not naturally or immediately society.

That *Bildung* is the important element of Hegel's concept of Civil Society, may now come into view. It is *Bildung* to attain the understanding of the two principles of Civil Society in paragraph 182 of *Philosophy of Right* as the contradiction as well as the motor of self-movement of Civil Society. More than other categories by which Hegel characterizes his concept of modern society, I prefer to expound *Bildung* in paragraph 187 of *Philosophy of Right* because there is a special kind of bond between Hegel's theory of society and his philosophy of ethics, and, consequently, from the same **place** there could emerge many problems.

CHAPTER TWO

THROUGH EDUCATION (*BILDUNG*) TOWARDS SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Introduction

In the first chapter, I expounded Hegel's description of Civil Society which is based on two principles. On the one hand, Civil Society is constituted by the existence of the individual as a concrete person as a totality of ends. On the other, every individual in Civil Society must stand with the others in the form of a social relationship. These two principles can become the potential of social conflict, because as they stand, they are (at least possibly) contradictory. On the other hand they can be a motor of the self – movement of society.

I called *Bildung* the concept in which the conflict between the two principles might be reconciled without destroying the conflict itself, which is a motor of Civil Society. I take paragraph 187 of *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* as the fundamental text of my analysis.

2.1. *Bildung* as the Living Moment of Civil Society's Maturation

2.1.1. Hegel's Concept of *Bildung* in Paragraph 187 of *Philosophy of Right*

In his work on *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel writes,

“Education is the absolute transition from an ethical substantiality which is immediate and natural to the one which is intellectual and so both infinitely subjective and lofty enough to have attained universality of form.”⁸³

By the quotation above, we comprehend *Bildung* as something which deals with the absolute transition or absolute passage (*der absolute Durchgangspunkt*). This absolute transition is of an ethical substantiality, from one which is immediate and natural to the other one which is intellectual, subjective, and spiritual.

To understand this absolute transition, I would begin with the various meanings of *Bildung* as self – education, self – shape, or self – cultivation of an individual in the realm of ethical life. It is also about the individual's

⁸³ See, G.W.F. HEGEL, *Philosophy of Right*, paragraph 187, translated with notes by T.M. Knox, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 125. It is my second English translation text of *Philosophy of Right* besides the principal translation, i.e. G.W.F. HEGEL, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, edited by Allen W. Wood, translated by H.B. Nisbet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

transition from a certain stage of ethical life, for example, from family's education to a higher stage in which someone becomes free a self – conscious individual. Saying *Bildung* is the absolute transition of an ethical substantiality, therefore, means of a certain process. Precisely, it is concerned with the process of individual maturity of reason in which there is man's effort to gain his self – consciousness "through his interaction with the objective world surrounding him."⁸⁴ Shortly, *Bildung* is that which is happening in an individual as a kind of a process toward maturity.

Our starting point is the fact that man is the focus of *Bildung* as self – education, self – shape, as well as self – cultivation. Man is *locus* in order that *Bildung* comes about. It is man as an individual, who has been there and undergoes it. Let us begin, therefore, with what we have noted well as the two principles of Civil Society.

The first principle of Civil Society leads us to look at the fact that individuals who exist in Civil Society are "private persons who have their own interest as their end."⁸⁵ They are not persons without a certain form of social life. The existence of persons in Civil Society is marked by that

⁸⁴ See, SHLOMO AVINERI, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 132.

⁸⁵ P.R., 187.

of belonging to a certain family. It is precisely that family which ties all its members ethically in the form of love and feeling.⁸⁶ Accordingly, it is in the family that someone grows up to find himself within other persons. The existence of the family in Civil Society, therefore, is indispensable since the existence of a person is marked only by his necessary existence in a unified family.⁸⁷ Consequently, family is the first necessary condition of *Bildung*.

After speaking of the locus of *Bildung*, now, I would like to go on to the form or the condition of the existence of *Bildung* in the ethical life. In the section on the Family in the *Philosophy of Right*, *Bildung* is the parental mode of bringing up children to guide and form them to gain certain characters and capabilities in order that, becoming free personalities, they will be ready to enter into Civil Society when they become of age.⁸⁸ Specifically, by training them to form good characters, parents teach their children what is ethically good in a family. In a family, children have to learn

⁸⁶ Cfr. P.R., 158 and the addition to paragraph 33.

⁸⁷ Hegel emphasizes that the individual's existence in family is not due to contract. An individual, rather, has its family membership ethically in "love, trust, and the sharing of the whole of individual existence." See, P.R., 163. Further, that marriage is not based on contract but instead it consists of the immediate ethical relationship marked by natural vitality and family ties, means that the existence of every individual in family has been there in a very substantial sense. Hegel, therefore, insists that family must be a union. In a unified family, the membership of family makes everyone in it feel at home and essentially exists. Cfr. P.R., 75, and SHLOMO AVINERI, *Op.Cit.*, 139.

⁸⁸ Cfr. P.R., 177.

how to behave well, that parents accustom them to doing what is good. In short, it is education in pedagogical or/and tutorial way in a family for children to be good.⁸⁹ One of the results of family *Bildung* as the form of educating children is that every person in a family will inherit many good characters and capabilities as well as talents.

In the subsequent process of *Bildung* in a family, children must exercise themselves by reasoning or reflecting on their daily relationships. It presupposes that children as human rational beings come into their moment of reasoning. It is their capacity of reason which puts in front of reason itself all the natural ethical simplicity and every given talent. All the ethical substances now come into their subjective understanding, in which the subject (for example, a child) knows ethics.

It is actually the family's moment of taking their participation to educating human beings as rational ones.⁹⁰ *Bildung*, therefore, becomes the way through which a family takes its important and indispensable role in Civil Society. The family becomes the basic life of every human social being in which every individual exercises how to educate

⁸⁹ Further, Hegel says, "Education (*pedagogik*) is the art of making human beings ethical." Cfr. P.R., 151.

⁹⁰ Cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 132.

and cultivate himself.⁹¹ In short, since a family has an ethical power over children, the individual's existence in a unified family is indispensable for *Bildung*.⁹²

In regard to the process of the individual's coming into Civil Society, *Bildung* as the family mode of bringing up children ethically is an educating way toward civilization, because in Civil Society, all persons need "to be recognized as legal persons and as capable both of holding free property of their own and of founding their own families."⁹³

In speaking of *Bildung* in the discourse of Ethical Life, therefore, the family has the power to bring up children. It is in fact the ethical power of the family to take care and educate children. The family, in other words, determines much of the basis of the ethical life, notwithstanding its immediate and natural form. It is properly the strength of the family that Hegel poses as his conception of Ethical Life before speaking of Civil Society.

In the previous chapter, I have noted that an individual takes part in a larger life to attain his full moral

⁹¹ Hegel emphasizes that family's education to the children must be based on the fact that "human beings do not arrive by instinct at what they are destined to become; on the contrary, they must attain this by their own efforts." See, P.R. 151 and 174 with its addition.

⁹² For more on this, cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, *Op. Cit.*, 139; also cfr. P.R., 75 and in addition to paragraph 173.

⁹³ P.R., 177.

life. It is society, then, in which Ethical Life has been there. “What we are as human beings we are only in a cultural community”, so that, “a language, and the related set of distinctions underlying our experience and interpretation, is something that can only grow in and be sustained by a community.”⁹⁴ Civil society appears as a whole complex (*Zusammenhang*) which “evolves into *particular systems* of needs, with their corresponding means, varieties of work, mode of satisfaction, and theoretical and practical education”.⁹⁵

Living in a certain society is not easy. It requires effort. Living in a certain form of social life requires both practical and theoretical knowledge. It requires understanding how to be and live in society as individuals taking part in a larger life. Furthermore, this means that Civil Society is charged by the education of individuals to be citizens. It is education for civilization. Civil Society provides an organic system of customs and institutions. It is responsible for preventing people from falling into being

⁹⁴ In this sense, I would like to cite Charles Taylor’s observation in emphasizing of the necessity of community in order that the life of language and culture is larger than that of the individual. And so, it happens only in community. See, CHARLES TAYLOR, *Hegel and Modern Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1998), 87.

⁹⁵ P.R., 201

un-educated. To be out of society means the nothingness of personality.⁹⁶

We have come into the course of *Bildung* from the realm of the family to that of Civil Society. The necessity of *Bildung* in the family is also a family's preparing children to come into the moment of the ethical dissolution of the family when an individual takes his participation in the larger life of Civil Society.

When Hegel says, "Civil society tears the individual away from family ties, alienates the members of the family from one another, and recognizes them as self-sufficient persons," and thus, "The individual becomes a *son of civil society*,"⁹⁷ he means that every individual in living Civil Society must undergo civil society's *Bildung*, because Civil Society has its *Bildung* as a way by which everyone must learn how to do it. Civil Society now appears and requires a system in which there is an interdependency connecting all

⁹⁶ We have known that, in accordance to Greek Polis tradition, it is impossible for the individual to live fully human life outside society. We will see in the following discussion that civil society must educate its people by insisting that parents send their children to school "in so far as this has a bearing on their capacity to become members of society". We have observed, then, that being or taking the member of society as the fulfillment of human reaching moral life is the main point of view of educating civilians. Cfr, P.R., 239.

⁹⁷ P.R., 238.

its contents into an established system of all-round interdependence.⁹⁸

Civil Society's interdependency requires an individual's self-sufficiency. Thus, *Bildung* is necessary for every individual who would be a full member of Civil Society. It is, now, in the form of exercising individual capabilities to overcome individual limitations and naturalness to open his possibility of sharing to the social-universal resources.

Hegel distinguishes the theoretical *Bildung* from the practical one.⁹⁹ Theoretical *Bildung* is about the capability of thinking all given, natural, as well as immediate things, doing estimates, comparing, and classifying objects. It is actually the process of understanding and reasoning by which all objects become subjective and understood by a cultivating subject. *Bildung* in this sense is the disposition of the mind toward growing out of an inner process of formation and cultivation. Theoretical *Bildung* is the availability of a subject

⁹⁸ The necessity of interdependency in an established system is evoked by the relationship among people to exist and satisfy their needs in society. Actually, we are still around the question of the two principles of civil society that Hegel describes it. Cfr. P.R., 182 and 183.

⁹⁹ Cfr. P.R., 197.

to go beyond his immediate experience¹⁰⁰ from the state of nature into that of rationality. It is human understanding in conceptual form.¹⁰¹ It is properly about understanding the truth. "Truth in philosophy means that the concept corresponds to reality."¹⁰² In truth, there is agreement between the subject who understands and the object understood by the subject. Theoretical *Bildung*, thus, is about the activity of human reason. It is the process of thinking and developing concepts through human reason as the locus of concepts. Through the activity of theoretical *Bildung*, human reason acquires what is received in a certain way in which nothing disappears, but everything is preserved.¹⁰³ Man, who is working to understand an object, is making that object a part of him.

Working on theoretical *Bildung*, then, means that nature does not stay at its mere existence. Rather, by the human rational capability it is raised up to the level of concept. It includes, for example, how to reflect rationally on every representational thought in the form of traditions, religions, symbols, religious rites, customs, social ethical life,

¹⁰⁰ Cfr. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, *Truth and Method*, second edition, translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975), pg. 14.

¹⁰¹ Cfr. P.R., 187.

¹⁰² P.R., in addition to paragraph 21.

¹⁰³ Cfr. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, *Op.Cit.*, 12.

etc.¹⁰⁴ In working on theoretical *Bildung*, according to Hegel, there can occur “a more advanced stage of *Bildung* (culture)”.¹⁰⁵ Theoretical *Bildung*, thus, is meant as the moment of a human rational being’s development in the more advanced reason of understanding natural objects. Whoever lacks this *Bildung* will also lack the rational power of abstraction.

When Hegel emphasizes *Bildung* as working to eliminate natural simplicity “whether as selflessness or as barbarism of knowledge and volition”¹⁰⁶, he would encompass not only theoretical *Bildung* but also the practical. Both are necessary in Civil Society.

Concretely, working on practical *Bildung* makes a subject exercise and get his applicable skill through an objective activity. Only by this practical *Bildung* is an individual able to link himself with his society. Through working in objective activity and developing the applicable skills, i.e. through practical *Bildung*, a subject links himself, between his totality of needs and his society as the necessary

¹⁰⁴ It must be noted well immediately that those representational thoughts in those forms display rationality too, and, thus, they constitute also the developing Idea in society, since, according to Hegel, “nature is rational within itself that it is this actual reason present within it which knowledge must investigate and grasp conceptually.” We will see this in the following sentences. See, P.R., in Preface page 12. Confer also P.R., 145-146.

¹⁰⁵ P.R., 32.

¹⁰⁶ P.R., 187.

means by which he can accomplish his needs.¹⁰⁷ In this *Bildung*, through which an individual joins his private life with his social-historical context as the larger life, it is still always necessary to remember that society in Hegel's view is the only place in which man can fulfill morality. Properly in this sense Hegel says,

“In this situation, the interest of the Idea, which is not present in the consciousness of these members of civil society as such, is the *process* whereby their individuality and naturalness are raised, both by natural necessity and by their arbitrary needs, to *formal freedom* and *formal universality of knowledge and volition*, and subjectivity is *educated* in its particularity.”¹⁰⁸

At this point, Hegel's understanding of *Bildung* as subjective participation of the actuality of Idea comes into view. Hegel considers that man's activity of thinking to understand object is his participation in the scientific development of Idea. Understanding an object means making an object correspond to subject's ratiocination so that such an object is raised up to the level of a universal concept.

Note that we are not concerned here with the broader question of Hegel's ontological vision of universe

¹⁰⁷ Cfr. P.R., 182 and 187.

¹⁰⁸ P.R., 187.

arriving at the expression of Spirit in a manifested world and human history. We are merely at pains to understand and trace some of the implications of *Bildung* as subject's effort to participate in the larger life of Civil Society in terms of Civil Society's two principles.¹⁰⁹

In the realm of Civil Society, *Bildung* is a means of reconciling individual and social ends. As a means, then, *Bildung* names the subjective hard working toward a rational agency and participation in the larger social life. In this subjective hard working of the human rational agent, there could be what I have previously called the absolute transition as the result of *Bildung*. Such a transition, however, would still be part of the human historical process *Bildung* has its conditions of existence.

We are now, therefore, in the course of *Bildung* as a means of the human historical process from antiquity to modernity through human rational capability. George Armstrong Kelly, who particularly studies Hegel's *Bildung*, says, "Antiquity (even *Sittlichkeit*) is not anti-intellectual for Hegel, but rather the ripe germ of all intellectual cultivation."¹¹⁰ In *Bildung*, the historical passage from

¹⁰⁹ I have discussed this in chapter I.

¹¹⁰ See, GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY, *Idealism, Politics, and History*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 344.

antiquity to modernity goes through man's education, maturation, fulfillment, joy, suffering, etc. Following Kelly's statement above, nature is the expression of rational Spirit, and then, it is rational within itself. That is the starting point of viewing *Bildung* as a means of building the unified relationship between individuals and Civil Society in the form of the human historical process. The present civil society must always be linked with that of the past and the anticipation of that of the future.

Hegel admits that natural things display rationality, albeit in a completely fragmented manner.¹¹¹ Each ethical substance of every individual in the past actually had the power to drive the individual's conduct, because although it was natural and fragmented, it constituted its self-consciousness. We have seen this previously as *Sittlichkeit*, the Ethical Life, by which man identifies himself with the actual living principle of self-consciousness. Human beings are actually driven by natural forces, too.

Only through the process of reflective reasoning in the form of *Bildung* is everything particular and different in *Sittlichkeit* raised up to the higher form. The problematic breakdown of unified society in Greek *Polis*, that is, the discontinuation of individual's identification with his

¹¹¹ Cfr. P.R., 146.

society, is the starting point of human rational effort in *Bildung*. *Bildung*, therefore, is a human task: to rise to a higher form of understanding. It certainly requires sacrificing all particularities and everything known immediately and naturally. Note that this does not mean the elimination of all those we have known from our parents' or traditions' educations. It means that all I have known now becomes my own, for I now understand subjectively. Again, in what is acquired by *Bildung* nothing disappears: everything is preserved.¹¹²

Let us turn back to our starting point, that is, the two principles of Civil Society following Hegel's description in paragraph 182 of *Philosophy of Right*. How can *Bildung* conduce the interdependency between the ends of an individual and that of Civil Society? In other words, how can we understand the conception of an individual's ability to educate himself and at the same time sacrifice his individuality to make himself a link "in the chain of this

¹¹² Cfr. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, *Op.Cit.*, pg. 12. George Armstrong Kelly also makes a comment on what Hegel attempts to eliminate and preserve at the same time everything in the past as the higher form for the necessary value of the present. He says that, through the conception of *Bildung*, "Hegel makes every conscious effort to adapt what is relevant of the classical ideal in his notions of curriculum and education for modern citizenship." Cfr. GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY, *Op.Cit.*, 344.

continuum (*Zusammenhang*)”¹¹³, that is, the social life as a larger life?

2.1.2. *Bildung* as the Moment of Struggle within a Subject

We have already seen how *Bildung* has various meanings: self-education, self-shape, and self-cultivation. I have discussed *Bildung* as the human rational activity to take the rationality of the things surrounding him in order to gain the self-authority of knowledge. Hegel says “Education (*Bildung*) irons out particularity to make it act in accordance with the nature of the thing (*Sache*)”.¹¹⁴ Moreover, he says,

“*Education*, in its determination, is therefore *liberation* and *work* towards higher liberation; [...] Within the subject, this liberation is the *hard work* of opposing mere subjectivity of conduct, of opposing the

¹¹³ The *continuum* word is the English translation of the German word, *Zusammenhang*. At paragraph 201 of *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel uses again this word to refer to “the whole complex that evolves into particular systems of needs, with their corresponding means, varieties of work, modes of satisfaction, and theoretical and practical education”. It is a kind of the entirely linked connections among the general masses. In its term, it could be also referred to social ties between particularity and universality, for instances, between individuals and society, in which the universal resources (namely, society) depends on every particular characteristic of the individual concerned, on the sharing of every family that initially provides the individuals in it by giving them the means and skills and then they could be the good member of their society. P.R., 238.

¹¹⁴ P.R., in addition to paragraph 187.

immediacy of desire as well as the subjective vanity and the arbitrariness of caprice.”¹¹⁵

Concretely, *Bildung* brings the subject to sacrifice his individuality and immediacy. Hegel, indeed, admits that sacrificing individualities and immediacy is not an easy thing for any person to do. Now, in the following discourse, I would expound what that subject effort to achieve liberation and higher stage means in *Bildung*. Precisely, I would explain how human reason must work hard to understand his social life as the larger one, which is the expression of reason. Further, it is also about how reason itself is capable of guiding human conduct in society.

I would stop for a moment to see how Hegel’s understanding of reason that guides human rational action is different from Kant’s. The necessity of reason in Kantian obligation comes purely from the will of the human rational being. According to Kant, it is reason as an end in itself that is a criterion of all human actions, by which and in which all rational beings are equal in dignity. Because of the rational being, an individual is the rational agent of self-governing his moral behavior. By its rational moral principles, in other words, every rational being is an end in itself.¹¹⁶ It is

¹¹⁵ P.R., 187.

¹¹⁶ In his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant says, “The will is thought as a capacity to determine itself to acting in conformity

properly rational autonomy as the ground of morality and makes every rational individual by nature the end in itself.

Moreover, there are categorical imperatives as universal law, by which moral duties are supposed to be unconditionally valid. The Formula of universal law is as follows; namely, “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”¹¹⁷ Every individual in Kant’s conception of morality, thus, is subjective as well as universal through and in their action; namely, the action that is motivated by rational will. Again, that is in the realm of the end in itself. Conclusively, in Kant, the necessity of reason in guiding human moral actions is demanded as the basis of objective grounds or reasons by which a rational agent constrains to

with the representation of certain laws. And such a capacity can be found only in rational beings. Now, what serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is an end, and this, if it is given by reason alone, must hold equally for all rational beings.” See, IMMANUEL KANT, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4:428, translated by Mary Gregor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 36.

¹¹⁷ See, *Ibidem*, 4:421. In the same text, Kant notes the meaning of a maxim as “The subjective principle of acting, and must be distinguished from the objective principle, namely the practical law. The former contains the practical rule determined by reason conformably with the conditions of the subject. It is therefore the principle in accordance with which the subject acts. But the law is the objective principle valid for every rational being, and the principle in accordance with which he *ought to act*, i.e., an imperative.”

act.¹¹⁸ This, then, makes Kantian ethics accused of being mere formalistic or empty formalism.

In Hegel's critic to Kant, Kantian radical rational autonomy as the ground of morality means a duty which is to be willed merely as a duty and not because of its content. Saying the pure and unconditional self-determination of the will as the root of duty as the result of a subject's rational will, then, according to Hegel, makes Kantian's moral conception deprived of content that comes from agreements or contradictions of every principle by which an individual acts. Hegel, then, criticizes Kant's moral obligation on duty as "a formal identity which necessarily excludes every content and determination."¹¹⁹ Kantian moral philosophy, based on categorical imperatives (as if they were the blue-prints for guiding subjective moral actions), is still dogmatic self-determination. Since the criterion of duty in Kant is to be purely formal, then, "moral

¹¹⁸ Cfr. ALLEN W. WOOD, *Kant*, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 136.

¹¹⁹ The content of moral obligations, for instance, in the form of duty, must come from contradictions among principles, namely, in social relations among human rational agents. Further, complete human life is that from which duty is determined and becomes concrete as well as not merely formal. According to Hegel, therefore, property and human life should exist and be respected in morality. P.R., 135.

autonomy has been purchased at the price of vacuity.”¹²⁰ In the context of the political theory, then, Kantian morality is not familiar with social relationships. For Hegel, meanwhile, duties must come from social life as the realm of objective field.¹²¹

Hegel tries to radicalize the Kantian self-autonomy of moral action on the basis of practical reason. He attempts to do so, however, without appealing to categorical imperatives. Self-determination should be understood as “pure-being-on-our-own that belongs to free thought.”¹²² Only in such is there “nothing under it or above it, and where we stand in solitude with ourselves alone.”¹²³ Hegel, in fact, is inspired by the harmony and immediacy of the Greek *Polis*, as well as the radical autonomy of Kant.

So, our question now is how to reconcile them. How can an individual pursue the self-determination of his ends as a concrete person and at the same time identify

¹²⁰ CHARLES TAYLOR, *Op.Cit.*, 77. Cfr. also, ROBERT B. PIPPIN, *Modernism as A Philosophical Problem*, second edition, (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 65.

¹²¹ According to Hegel, society is rational because it is the objective field, in which “the right of insight applies to insight into *legality* or *illegality*.” It is also because “action is an alteration which must exist in an actual world and thus seeks recognition in it.” Cfr. P.R., 132.

¹²² See ROBERT B. PIPPIN, *Op.Cit.*, 65.

¹²³ *Ibidem*. Both of this footnote and of the footnote number 38, Robert B. Pippin is quoting from what Hegel said in *Hegel's Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, translated by W. Wallace, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

himself with the ethical ends of the society in which he lives?

Within a subject, now, *Bildung* becomes a struggle because he must express his life in conformity with the expression of reason itself, and then, the true expression of rationality is found in social life.¹²⁴ In that struggle itself, there must be the long process of the subjective cultivation to become an educated man.¹²⁵ It is in fact the educated man who has already undergone this long process of *Bildung* and then come to understand his private life in the social life. The process of *Bildung*, however, does not cease here because *Bildung* itself has no goals.¹²⁶ *Bildung* itself is only a

¹²⁴ Hegel notes very well in *Philosophy of Right* the point that “legal and political institutions are rational in principle and therefore absolutely necessary, and the question of the form in which they arose or were introduced is entirely irrelevant to a consideration of their rational basis.” In another part of *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel emphasizes, “Only through this mediation with the universal does he [the individual] simultaneously provide for himself and gain *recognition* in his own eyes and in the eyes of others.” It is concerned too with Hegel’s vision that in individual’s realizing his rational being, society has its indispensable part, because the world (of which society is the part) is the necessary expression of rationality itself. Cfr. P.R., 207, 219, in its translated edition by T.M. Knox. Cfr. also CHARLES TAYLOR, *Op.Cit.*, 47 – 51.

¹²⁵ Hegel admits this long process of *Bildung* within a struggling subject when he says, “The process of development [*Bildung*] begins with a content whose form is sensuous and immediate and, by means of long and arduous work, arrives the form of thought appropriate to this content and thereby gives it simple and adequate expression.” Cfr. P.R., 217.

¹²⁶ In *Truth and Method*, Hans-Georg Gadamer comments, “Like nature, *Bildung* has no goals outside itself.” He adds, then, that “In having no goals outside itself, the concept of *Bildung* transcends that of the mere

means by which an individual understands his world and has knowledge of the world itself. Through *Bildung*, an individual knows how to contribute his existence to his society.¹²⁷

It is through *Bildung* that an individual comes to understand the connection between his ends and those of society, since *Bildung* itself includes striving toward thought and system in the inner-ness of an individual, in picking up what is essential in every matter around a subject, and then drawing that which is essential to the common level of understanding conceptually.¹²⁸ *Bildung*, therefore, has its role for every person to fully exist in Civil Society.¹²⁹

Only by courage in struggling to go beyond all his limitations and individuality can an individual get beyond his immediacy and naturalness and really participate in society. It is by courage to face the individual and particular limitations that an individual goes beyond himself towards what is the universal form of understanding everything

cultivation of given talents, from which concept it is derived." Cfr. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, *Op.Cit.*, 11.

¹²⁷ Cfr. P.R., 187, 197.

¹²⁸ Cfr. GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY, *Op.Cit.*, 345.

¹²⁹ In saying of *Bildung* as that through which an individual takes his participation in social life and subsequently becomes one of every moment of civil society, Hegel says, "Each individual, by a process of self-determination, makes himself a member of one of the moments of civil society through his activity, diligence, and skill, and supports himself in this capacity." Cfr. P.R., 207.

surrounding that subject itself, namely, his living society. When this is happening, someone is growing up.

2.1.3. *Bildung* as the Moment of Growing Up

Although *Bildung* as the individual mediation to conform his particularity to universality requires a hard struggle and accounts for any disfavour to an individual itself, as I have preceded it, *Bildung* as an education is the progressive transition of every individual. In other words, there is progression toward maturity as a result of doing *Bildung*.

Remaining in immediacy and naturalness means staying at a particular stage, in the merely given order which drives individual in particular conditions, in unconsciousness whereby there is no fullness of rationality. Man as a rational being naturally tends to go beyond the limits of his particularity toward the fulfilment of his end in the form of underlying the entire plan of rationality. Hegel admits that this process is by means of a long and arduous

work until achieving the higher stage of development in arriving at the form of thought.¹³⁰

But, this is properly the process of development, in which every individual grows up in the form of self-consciousness. Individual's growing up as a result of *Bildung* is the development of society itself because, thanks to the breaking up of individuals' self-identification with society, there bears a rational effort of redefining the conformity between individual ends and those of society. This developing passage is very important for both individual and society mediated by *Bildung*, because, concretely, the more educated people are, the more likely social change toward the equilibrium of the two principles of civil society will be.

In speaking of *Bildung* as something by which and in which an individual grows up, and as one which affects social change, I would follow the interpretation of Charles Taylor, in *Hegel and Modern Society*. Social change, in Taylor's example, is based on the change of a people's idea or orientation of life. Or, in other words, it is a people's idea that can shift the allegiance of people to society, let us say, after the break down of individual's identification with his society.¹³¹ The educated man, as one who has achieved the

¹³⁰ Cfr. P.R., 217.

¹³¹ CHARLES TAYLOR, *Op.Cit.*, 127.

result of *Bildung*, knows and becomes alert very well through understanding the Idea which is taking place in the mind of the people in his society. The educated man grows up through his hard-work of self-education (*Bildung*) to respond to what is there in people's minds (Idea) of his society.

Bildung as social reflective reason in its rational activity, therefore, moves people's rational consciousness in raising all the particularities of civil society in the form of, for example, myths, traditions, folklore, religious culture, etc., up to the point of the new constitution in the light of reflective reason. It means interpreting all those particularities in the long history of what was there in people's minds.

Social change is just one of the results of subject's activity in *Bildung*. Importantly, through the work of *Bildung* in history, a subject is staying in the rational moment of memorizing, presenting, and valuing all the particularities of society to make all of them objective in his own understanding. Through *Bildung*, therefore, a subject grows up in understanding what was, is, and will be in a certain society. In other words, by *Bildung*, a subject becomes aware of his history. Think of Gadamer's interpretation in *Truth and Method* of how *Bildung* makes someone exercise his intentional memory of history and makes him grow up to be

capable of giving himself to existence in his world.¹³² *Bildung* is, thus, the element in which we move and exist in both our private and social life.

2.2. Building Citizens as Educated People towards a Steady Civil Society

2.2.1. The Educated Man in Civil Society

Our question now is: how is an educated man as the result of *Bildung* necessary for interconnecting the two principles of Civil Society that is depicted by Hegel in paragraph 182 of *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*?

Hegel, in fact, sets up very well the inter-correlation between individual efforts as a rational being and the necessity of society as the place in which that effort will be accomplished. Characterizing an educated man as the culmination of *Bildung*, therefore, must be construed in accordance with Hegel's depiction of Civil Society itself (as I have expounded in chapter I).

As we know, Hegel depicts Civil Society as that in which there is "a system of complete interdependence,

¹³² Cfr. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, *Op. Cit.*, 14-16.

wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all.”¹³³ In such a society, there must be a kind of interdependency of work by which people can satisfy their needs in so far as, “*Subjective selfishness turns into a contribution towards the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else.*”¹³⁴ *Bildung* now manifests itself in the form of an individual process of education and skill. Meanwhile, individual education and skill in their turn render an individual capable of contributing his existence with others in a certain society which is depicted as one which essentially is a market economy.¹³⁵

The educated man, thanks to the *Bildung* process, is a professional working in the socio - economic web. He can understand what there is in people’s minds and so is able to satisfy needs. Concretely, the educated man is capable of applying in a practical skill what he achieves as a theoretical education. Thus, the conduct of the educated man in modern society is marked by a socio – economic link.

¹³³ Cfr. P.R., 183 in its translated edition by T.M. Knox.

¹³⁴ P.R., 199.

¹³⁵ Again, we can say that *Bildung* is as Hegel’s way of resolving the contraposition of the two principles of civil society, on which civil society is construed. Just for putting again in mind, those two principles are the concrete person as the totality of needs and the mixture of natural necessity, and then, that totality of needs is satisfied or accomplished only through being mediated by the form of universality, namely, the others in civil society. Cfr. P.R., 182.

Shortly, in a certain sense, this is a kind of individual capability of reading and understanding both conceptually and practically what is coming about in people's orientation of an ideal society.

We can also develop another point. Since the educated man is not merely only part of the social life but also exists in the social life as a human rational agent, he is also attentive to any change of social orientation in accordance with what is in people's minds. He is even sometimes the agent of such social change, since, by *Bildung*, an educated man is capable of reflecting and raising up all particularities by "representing them, estimating them, and comparing them with one another and then with the means they employ, their consequences, etc., and with a sum total of satisfaction."¹³⁶

Hegel also calls the educated man one who stays "at a more advanced stage of culture".¹³⁷ It is the ability to cultivate concepts in such a rational way that produces scientific understanding of a certain object. The educated man knows how to make every object surrounding him be his object of scientific analysis. He succeeds in moving beyond a given and immediate reality through the rational

¹³⁶ P.R., 20.

¹³⁷ P.R., 32.

reflective process (that is, *Bildung*) to make reality itself become understood. He doesn't add anything to his reality, but he reflects it to become a part of him, because reality itself is rational.¹³⁸ Shortly, there is no thought without history.¹³⁹

We now know how important *Bildung* is in the context of Civil Society as Hegel describes it. The educated man is at the culmination of the process of *Bildung*; he becomes the real human rational agent of society's self-movement. There is still something we leave behind as the rest of all those explanations of the importance of *Bildung* for overcoming the opposition between the two principles of Civil Society.

¹³⁸ In Hegel's view, nature is rational within itself. But, he adds that the measure of the laws of nature is external to us and, thus, "our cognition adds nothing to them and does not advance them: it is only our cognition of them which can expand." Through the act of actual reason, then, the human task is only to investigate and grasp conceptually what is in nature. And properly because of this, human beings are called to the dignity of freeing thought from any particular determination. Accordingly, in his preface of *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel says of the famous statement, "What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational." See P.R., in addition to Preface pg. 12 – 13, and pg. 20.

¹³⁹ In Hegelian terms, all the contents of any concept have already had in themselves the form of existence. Consequently, there is nothing in our knowledge based on the emptiness, on nothing. About this, Hegel says, "One cannot therefore say that the concept arrives at anything new; on the contrary, the last determination coincides in unity with the first." Further, Hegel also makes a speculative way of thinking content and form as the same thing. He says, "The *mode of existence* of a concept and its *determinacy* are one and the same thing." See P.R., 32.

2.2.2. Civilians as Educated People: Conformity with Universality

Hegel says, “It is through work of education that the subjective will attains *objectivity* even within itself, that objectivity in which alone it is for its part worthy and capable of being the *actuality* of the Idea.”¹⁴⁰ In wishing to treat the necessity of *Bildung* to the building of the interdependency of every element of Civil Society, I would first observe Hegel’s vision of the universe. Secondly, I would persist in the discourse of Civil Society as the indispensable part for an individual to accomplish his ends.

In Hegel’s vision, the world is the objective realm in which the Absolute, represented as Spirit, is unfolding or manifesting itself. Through Spirit, the Absolute is realizing or actualizing itself in the world. Meanwhile, for Spirit the world is its objectivity or actuality, which is both identical with itself and at the same times opposed to itself, or in a word, identity and the otherness (non – identity).¹⁴¹ Only in this kind of actuality in the world can the self – movement be possible for the Absolute. The world, then, has the

¹⁴⁰ P.R., 187.

¹⁴¹ G.W.F. HEGEL, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A.V. Miller, (Oxford-New York-Toronto-Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1977), in Preface, 14.

purposive activity of the Absolute itself in the plan of rationality. Why plan of rationality?

Because, according to Hegel, the Spirit can be towards its purpose of self – actualization only in the form of science.¹⁴² It is through science that the individual self-consciousness can raise every existential – material being in the world, and then, man can live for his world belonging to his knowledge. But, really, it is in the long process of rational and reflective cultivation because, in the world, Idea finds itself as the distinction between the concept and reality, and hence also between determinacy and particularity. The world, then, becomes that in which the Idea undergoes a kind of opposition within itself. At the same time, Idea is toward the capacity of self-determining for itself and in itself. Hegel describes this as the scientific development of Idea towards self-sufficiency through unfolding and at the same time folding itself.¹⁴³ The truth is found in and by Idea when distinctions are overcome or resolved by reconciliation. Those distinctions between concept and reality are raised to be the universal form of thought. The world in the end becomes the part of his self-

¹⁴² Hegel says, "The Spirit that, so developed, knows itself as Spirit, is *Science*; Science is its actuality and the realm which it builds for itself in its own development." See, *Ibidem*.

¹⁴³ Cfr. P.R., 32.

consciousness. In other words, it becomes his-own. According to Hegel, it becomes actually the mediated world in which the self – consciousness of every individual is able to live with and in science.¹⁴⁴

It is *Bildung* as self – education, self – shape, or self – cultivation, which takes the part of thinking as individual consciousness in the form of universal thought. Since every individual is a human rational agent, he should make many rational efforts, that is, through and in *Bildung*, in order to be the adequate means of the unfolding Spirit. Through *Bildung*, the human task is to come into objectivity in a way that man is able to gain or achieve an advanced stage of culture, in which he is the adequate actuality of Spirit itself.¹⁴⁵ *Bildung*,

¹⁴⁴ Different from Karl Marx's view on the necessity of the industrial revolution as the major fact of human history in order to transform nature, for Hegel, human history must be marked by man itself to dominate and transform nature in order that the world itself is to create and sustain a universal consciousness in man. It is because, according to Hegel, nature, namely the material world, or Aether, is "the ground and the soil of Science or knowledge in general." Meanwhile, according to Hegel, Science itself is the actuality of Spirit and the realm which it builds for itself in its own element. Cfr. CHARLES TAYLOR, *Hegel and Modern Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1998), 50 – 51. Also cfr. G.W.F. HEGEL, *Op. Cit.*, 14.

¹⁴⁵ In paragraph 187 of *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel says, "Spirit attains its actuality only through internal division, by imposing this limitation and finitude upon itself in [the shape of] natural needs and the continuum (*Zusammenhang*) of this external necessity, and *in the very process of adapting itself to these limitations*, by overcoming them and gaining its *objective existence [Dasein]* within them." Accordingly, when man achieves the advanced stage of culture, thanks to the process of *Bildung*, he actually gains a certain objectivity which is worthy and capable of being that

then, is a human exercise of reason which has its content in nature, because, as we have already seen, nature is rational. Again, the process of *Bildung* itself as the exercise of human reason, is that whereby particularity and immediacy are superseded and raised to universality, for example to the form of concept or thought.¹⁴⁶

Understanding, therefore, is the principal indication of the educated man as the culmination of *Bildung*.¹⁴⁷ It also means the raising of all the particularities and immediacies to the level of the common quality in the form of a formal universality, namely, in the form of concept itself.

Hegel calls the educating of man through the activity of thinking to the conformity with universality, that is, with the self – actualizing Idea. Hegel calls this activity of reason the essence of every human being, since a human being is rational.¹⁴⁸

Conclusively, I would cite what Hegel says in this context, “This self – consciousness which comprehends itself as essence through thought and thereby divests itself

actuality, namely, the actuality of the Idea or Spirit. Of *Bildung*, therefore, Hegel says, “This cultivation of the universality of thought is the absolute value of *education*.” And also, “*Education* is an immanent moment of the absolute, and that it has infinite value.” Cfrl. P.R., 20, 187.

¹⁴⁶ Cfr. P.R., 21

¹⁴⁷ Cfr. P.R., 187.

¹⁴⁸ Cfr. P.R., 21

of the contingent and the untrue constitutes the principle of right, of morality, and of all ethics.”¹⁴⁹ So, I have actually enlarged upon Hegel’s basic concept of *Bildung*, through which the two principles of Civil Society are linked and understandable.

2.2.3. *Bildung* as a Means of Social Integration

Why is it necessary to speak of *Bildung* when speaking of Civil Society? Hegel’s depiction of society is actually based on his ontological vision. In order to know why Hegel emphasizes *Bildung* in his conception of Civil Society, we must place its necessity in his vision of the universe.

In the previous section, we discussed Hegel’s ontological view of the universe, in which all things are in the rational plan. Man’s task is to develop or cultivate himself, so far as to take part in that plan in order that the universe becomes more and more the adequate place for Spirit to actualize itself. We have seen that this task is accomplished in *Bildung*.

¹⁴⁹ P.R., 21

An individual, however, can not do *Bildung* merely as an individual, because as human beings we are always in a cultural community. Living in society, therefore, is the indispensable part of an individual who wishes to accomplish his ends. Thus, we have been discussing the conception of society as that, through which and in which, an individual links himself with the plan of rationality as the necessary plan in order that Spirit might actualize itself in the world.

Hegel claims this is the difference between modern and ancient society. The failure of ancient society to achieve social and ethical harmony between people's ends and that of society was marked by the broken-down individuals' identification with their society.¹⁵⁰ We saw in the previous section how Hegel tries to take over the conceptions of ancient Greek society in the way of an individual's identification with *Polis* in the immediate and natural form,

¹⁵⁰ The social case that made the generation of Hegel's epoch think out the political philosophy was French Revolution. It made the thinker of freedom redefine it once again, of how to create a world of social institutions in which people did feel immediately at home, and experience freedom as something already established in their life both privately and publicly. Accordingly, Charles Taylor in his *Hegel and Modern Society* says, "Hegel's account of the breakdown of the Greek city state turns on the underlying purpose of realizing a consciousness and way of life which universal." Cfr. CHARLES TAYLOR, *Hegel and Modern Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 63 and 100. TERRY PINKARD, *Hegel's Phenomenology. The Sociality of Reason*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 187.

to his conception of social system which is based on the ontological vision of Spirit, in which every individual “can give himself to unity with the whole without losing his rational freedom”.¹⁵¹

In putting forward *Bildung*, then, Hegel claims a depiction of modern society, by which and in which an individual will succeed in raising himself from immediacy and naturalness, to maturity. He claims also that it is the modern society in which there is recognition of individual equality and sameness to achieve the ends of every individual as a human rational being. He thinks of society which considers human being as the base of Ethical Life in the realm of rationality. He puts forward that rational realm as a social system which drives society toward maturity.¹⁵² Of that social system, we have seen previously that in modern society there must be a kind of people's ends conformity with that of society. Of such, Hegel says,

“In the course of the actual attainment of selfish ends – an attainment conditioned in this way by universality – there is formed a system of complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all. On this system, individual happiness, etc., depend, and only

¹⁵¹ CHARLES TAYLOR, *Op.Cit.*, 139.

¹⁵² Cfr. P.R., in Preface pg. 12.

in this connected system are they actualized and secured.”¹⁵³

In putting forward *Bildung* as an individual’s self – education or self – cultivation, there should be a kind of renewed *Sittlichkeit* in the new form, in which man as a human rational agent actualizes his freedom in the new vision of the world, namely, the world which is based on the ontological foundation of Spirit in the necessity of a rational plan.¹⁵⁴

Hence, Hegel is optimistic that his conception of Civil Society based on his ontological vision is more adequate for realizing integration among the elements of civil society than the previous conception. He is also optimistic that what society produces is for guaranteeing the ends of every individual, meanwhile every individual feels secured in living in his society in sharing his possibilities in the universal resources of society itself.

Now, in modern society, human reason is the agent of the social changes in the history of society. Man’s task in *Bildung* is to understand the movement of Spirit which is actualizing itself. Hegel actually wants to apply his ontological vision to his conception of society. Further, he

¹⁵³ P.R., 183.

¹⁵⁴ Cfr. TERRY PINKARD, *Op.Cit.*, 295. CHARLES TAYLOR, *Op.Cit.*, 84.

calls that application civilization, because civilizing people means making them become civilians of Civil Society. We are, actually, turning back to what I have expounded in the first chapter on social integration in Hegelian Civil Society by any dialog between a person in civil society as a totality of needs and the necessity of society in order to accomplish those needs. The others in society are, on the one hand, opponents of his needs, and, on the other hand, an indispensable part of his effort to satisfy his needs. It is through *Bildung* that every individual in society can contribute to achieve the realization of the world's purpose, i.e. to become rational and based on the rational plan. There emerges the optimistic world which creates itself towards its maturity.

CHAPTER THREE

PROPOSING SOME REFLECTIVE QUESTIONS AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ON *BILDUNG* AS THE IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF HEGEL'S CONCEPT ON CIVIL SOCIETY

Introduction

Hegel discusses the need for *Bildung* in the interconnection between particularity and universality, in paragraph 187 of *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. In this section, I would like to offer a critical summary of *Bildung* as we have discussed it to this point.

3.1. The Necessity of *Bildung* in Hegel's Depiction of Civil Society: A Summary

Firstly, *Bildung* makes an individual capable of educating, cultivating, and shaping himself in the global vision of society. The educated man as the culmination of *Bildung* knows that the way of life in which he lives is the one in a continuing historical way. That way of life is formed along with the history of society. In other words, *Bildung* brings an individual into awareness that he is in a

certain society the locus of the course of *Sittlichkeit* in history. *Bildung*, thus, makes an individual capable of not remaining in his particular being and time.

This also means that in an educated man as the culmination of *Bildung*, what was ethically true and believed as morally good in the previous or ancient society, now, must be in a relationship with the totality of history itself in such a way that there is always something which is renewed at present towards maturity.¹⁵⁵ At the crucial moment of its break-down, *Sittlichkeit* redefines itself. *Sittlichkeit* remains present in modern society, in its redefinition and renewal towards maturity.

We have seen how the Greek *Polis*, as Hegel's model of ancient society, had succeeded in establishing every individual's identification with society. It was the moral system of *Polis* in *Sittlichkeit*. But, Hegel criticizes that identification with society as the one which is based on the natural intuition and, consequently, it is very difficult to keep an established society which represents the ends of every individual in it. There is, nevertheless, something that Hegel preserves from the ancient Greek *Polis*, i.e. the

¹⁵⁵ Cfr. KARL LÖWITZ, *Da Hegel a Nietzsche, La Frattura Rivoluzionaria nel Pensiero del Secolo XIX*, translated by Giorgio Colli, (Torino: Einaudi, 2000), 434.

Chapter Three

Proposing Some Reflective Questions And Tentative Conclusions On Bildung As The Important Element Of Hegel's Concept On Civil Society

necessity of society for an individual to achieve his ends since it is society with which every individual must link himself. Again, the disintegration of the Greek *Polis* is at the same time the gracious moment to redefine the relationship between the ends of every individual and that of society. It is actually Hegel's typical solution with regard to the problems in the previous conceptions of a relationship between an individual as the concrete person with his totality of ends and an individual as a citizen.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ I refer to the failure of the French Revolution. The French Revolution would respond the questions of the participation of people in social life; meanwhile the revolutionists had destroyed what was in the ancient society. In doing so, they therefore didn't build anything along with a continuing society. But, besides having shown the failure of revolutionists to organize a new community, nevertheless, the revolution itself has evoked the people's demands on the equality relied on human mind. In other part, by proposing the failure of building an established society in Greek *Polis*, Hegel would propose the continuing society in the form of renewing *Sittlichkeit* before the course of human history itself. By criticizing some previous conceptions of the relationship between the individual and society, Hegel actually would propose his own vision of the renewing society in the plan of rationality itself instead of intuition or natural principles. Hegel would put forward the necessity of human reason in order to set out social reality according the guidance of rationality plan itself. It takes, then, the educating or cultivating individual's *Bildung*. It means also that *Bildung* is really the self – formation, self – cultivation, and self – shape, and not revolution, correcting what the revolutionary social change of the French Revolution had done. *Bildung*, shortly, is about understanding the historical society itself. It is what I mean of Hegel's typical solution in regard with the problems of the relation between the ends of individuals and that of society. He synthesizes what there has been in previous conceptions and modifies them to become his own vision philosophically. Cfr. KARL LÖWITZ, *Op.Cit.*, 364. CHARLES TAYLOR, *Hegel and Modern Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1998), 94 – 95.

Secondly, *Bildung* draws every individual out of his particularities and immediacies to come into the higher level of knowledge. Hegel actually needs to say this in order to preserve his vision of the universe as the objective realm in which Spirit is unfolding itself. In other words, the need for *Bildung* in Civil Society is systematic. In order to accomplish his ends, the rational human individual must take part of the self – manifesting Idea in the form of *Bildung* in a certain social life. Hegel's conception of Spirit positing itself in the world, then, is the guarantee of the necessity of *Bildung* in speaking of civil society.

Because the universality in Hegel's vision is that of the history of Spirit unfolding itself in the world in the necessary plan of rationality, *Bildung* makes the world really a more and more adequate expression of such a Spirit. And I would like to emphasize again that it is in the particular human being that *Bildung* occurs.

Thirdly, it follows that in speaking of the necessity of *Bildung* in Civil Society, Hegel has already put man as the focus of history itself. It is man as a human rational agent who does not merely exist in a certain society, but rather who is the social agent which determines society as his own, because society itself represents his ends. On this reading, *Bildung* is the civilizational process on the grounds of the

economic interconnection of society, in which an individual tries to go beyond his limit into the higher level of education and skill.

Hence, Ethical Life in modern society (or in Charles Taylor's term, the realized *Sittlichkeit*¹⁵⁷), is the entirety of both citizen and society, in which, according to Hegel's ontological vision, both participate in the self – actualizing Idea. Only can the educated man (as the result of the process of *Bildung*) know and understand how universality comes about in his particularity without losing his radical autonomy and freedom. Man is no longer an island, since each individual must take part in the larger life of society. At the same time, man is the end in itself in society because he is actually free and the end in itself. In other words, because of man's nature as a human rational being, there is only man in the context of history, society, and progression.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ CHARLES TAYLOR, *Op.Cit.*, 84.

¹⁵⁸ Saying of man's nature as human rational being in history, we can say that human mind, indeed, is opened to its historical context. It is of mind as human activity and engagement to natural and social world. In regard with Hegel's ontological vision of the world, an educated man in *Bildung*, then, has this opened-mind to social movements which is understood as the movement of Idea itself towards its self-determination. As a result, an educated man is capable also of passing any re-definition and re-interpretation of traditional or antique insights of factual enquiry, when a certain tradition, for example, is no longer adequate for a certain rational consideration. He knows and understands how to re-define, re-interpret, and re-manifest what was believed in the past. In other words, he knows about the process of developing what is considered rationally as truth. What

All these come about only because of human mind, which must be the adequate mediation for Spirit to actualize or manifest itself in the objective world. Because human reason itself is deeply social, man as a human rational being is also capable of collocating himself as the centre of any historical process towards maturity in accordance with the plan of rationality itself.¹⁵⁹

Fourthly, because Hegel depicts civil society as an economic movement among producers, consumers, and a legal system that guarantees such a movement, *Bildung* is the necessary process of civilization in the form of the exercise of human reason. Regarding the economic movement in Civil Society, I have talked about theoretical education and practical education. The result of *Bildung* is the individual's general and permanent ability to share his education and

was in the past is admitted in the present as that which must be considered to be transformed in the higher level rationally. In a certain sense, it is admitted too that in the past there was a failure of mind in grasping and representing Ethical Life. It is because there was an inadequacy of defining and presenting what was believed as truth in the past. By this mediation of rational re-interpretation, re-definition, and re-manifestation of what is believed as the truth in the past, now, in present, those beliefs are raised up and transformed both in a more universal-rational level. It is called as the process of a rational embodiment of what was immediate and natural by a subject in the form of social and traditional progressive change. Cfr. P.R., 185. Cfr. also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 357-358.

¹⁵⁹ Cfr. TERRY PINKARD, *Hegel's Phenomenology. The Sociality of Reason*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 300. Also, ROBBERT PIPPIN, *Modernism as a Philosophical Problem*, second edition, (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1999) 71.

skill, in order that the economic movement of society can come about through increasing its resources.¹⁶⁰ Through *Bildung*, every individual in Civil Society, now, is in searching and maintaining their possibility of sharing in the universal resources. And, further, it means that an educated and skilled man has his social role and takes his part in every moment of civil society through “his activity, diligence, skill, and supports himself in this capacity”.¹⁶¹

3.2. The Question about the *Outcasts* in Hegel's Civil Society

In civil society universality and particularity are “bound up with and conditioned by each other although they have become separated”.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ Cfr. P.R., 199.

¹⁶¹ P.R., 207.

¹⁶² P.R., 184. We have seen that in a concrete social life, the relation between particularity and universality is a kind of how to harmonize the private and public sphere, from which at the same time there emerge many problems. It bears also the distinction of what is and what ought. Civil society, then, is the sphere of the distance between particularity and universality that should be mediated. We have seen those problems and solutions in regard with Hegel's ontological vision of the world, that is, the self – unfolding Spirit in the objective world. Cfr. JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW ARATO, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, (Cambridge, London: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992, 1999), 95 – 96.

Speaking of social integration in society, Hegel in a certain sense conceives Civil Society as a general and universal family, in which every member of society becomes the son of his society.¹⁶³ We have seen that this general and universal family is marked by the system of needs, protected by the system of law, and controlled by means of the general authority. Something which is expected by people from society in such a social system, then, is that the more general resources are augmented the more possible it becomes for their ends to be satisfied.

In this plan of social integration towards a general and universal family which is based on an economical system, the question I would put forward is about the outcasts. Hegel says that there must be no outcasts in his depiction of society because it is society which is the part of the self – manifesting Idea, in which thinking rationally is the guarantee of the equality of every individual.¹⁶⁴ In this case, he would answer the question of outcasts proposing the acquisition of rationality through individual efforts in order that society is more and more the adequate emanation of Spirit manifesting itself in an objective world. This is, shortly, Hegel's solution for every possible social problem.

¹⁶³ Cfr. P.R., 238 – 239.

¹⁶⁴ Cfr. P.R., 209.

Since building a society based on an economic movement with the requirement of general and universal resources generates social conflicts, we can ask whether Hegel's solution in his ontological vision is capable of addressing the social problems of the contemporary society, i.e. the problem of outcasts. Is his solution of proposing *Bildung* adequate in facing social problems of contemporary society?

In the following section, I would attempt to observe the contemporary social problems of outcasts which Hegel might leave us today.

3.2.1 The Questions of Immigration

The question of the contemporary society that I would propose in regard to Hegel's plan of building an integral society is that of immigration. Why immigration? Because the social phenomenon of immigration itself is usually motivated by economics,¹⁶⁵ while Hegel underlies his

¹⁶⁵ Hegel admits too that the population in a certain society will grow to a certain point in which there is not enough resource to provide citizens. It is properly about extending economy resources to a higher possibility of providing the ends of its citizens. It is also the tendency of every society to establish itself in order to become a steady society economically. It opens, then, the possibility of a mixture of the multi – national people in the form of colonization. Cfr. P.R., 247 – 248.

depiction of Civil Society on the reciprocal economical needs, which are concerned immediately with economic affairs, Hegel's social conception is still relevant today.

The social question of immigration is concerned with the phenomenon of an industrial society, which evokes people from a lower socio – economic level in one society to come to look for a better wage in another society. As a result, there will be among other things the jump in growth of the population, for example, in a certain industrial society. There may come at a certain point where society can no longer provide an institutional education for civilization. The question of immigration is a contemporary problem that casts doubt on Hegel's solution of self-sufficiency for civilization.¹⁶⁶

The first question which the problem of immigration gives us from the social phenomenon of immigration is that of social change. Multi-national

¹⁶⁶ We have known that Hegel proposes the concept of self-sufficiency as the plan of civilization, namely, *Bildung*. In proposing self-sufficiency, Hegel considers an integration of civil society in a certain level, at which civil society becomes similar to the integral family. Self-sufficiency then becomes a social bond of civil society, by which everyone now becomes a son of civil society; that is similar to love as the natural and immediate bond of family. But, now, facing the problem of multi-national immigration, what Hegel hopes of an integral civil society which is based on the equilibrated of the two principles of particularity and universality is very difficult to apply. Cfr. P.R., 158, 238.218-219. Cfr. also JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW ARATO, *Op.Cit.*,106.

Chapter Three

Proposing Some Reflective Questions And Tentative Conclusions On Bildung As The Important Element Of Hegel's Concept On Civil Society

immigration has changed the social structure. An industrial – modern society, for example, faces every social change that possibly derives from a multi-national immigration and the globalization of the economic market. The possible social change which derives from the social phenomenon of an industrial society in the modern world has occasioned a kind of redefinition or re-interpretation of Hegel's guarantee to establish civil society, namely, Spirit which is self – manifesting or self – unfolding in the objective world. Accordingly, we have seen this tendency of social change in the form of the break-up of *Sittlichkeit*, where there is no longer an identification of an individual with his society. Consequently, the industrial – modern society is facing a threat of social change at any moment.¹⁶⁷

The second question is that of public power. In facing the jumping growth of population, public power should keep or maintain social stability and integrity. It is about the question of establishing or maintaining a steady society at a certain economic level, while at the same time, society itself faces the questions that attend a multi-cultural population. Can a multi-cultural population become a people?

¹⁶⁷ Cfr. CHARLES TAYLOR, *Op.Cit.*, 125.

In order to establish or maintain the social integration of civil society in the context of the multicultural society, the general authority might, for example, pass an oppressive law in the name of civil education. The administration of justice in the form of a positive law is at risk of being the opponent of the ends of a multi-cultural people, or vice versa. Public security is challenged by the ends of massive numbers of people. We, in fact, are back to the discourse of social change as the moment of redefining *Sittlichkeit*.

In those cases above, the new generation in the aftermath of immigration could quite plausibly be excluded from the process of civilization. In the aftermath of immigration, there will be born a new generation that is removed from its parent's *Sittlichkeit*, while they are still regarded as foreigners in a certain industrial – modern society. As long as this new generation in the aftermath of immigration can be an outcast in an industrial society, so long does the question of *Bildung* remain posed in the face of the cultural integration in the case of social integration. When being applied to the reality of contemporary society, *Bildung* towards an individual self-sufficiency as a means of the social integration as the link of a market economy, as

Chapter Three

Proposing Some Reflective Questions And Tentative Conclusions On Bildung As The Important Element Of Hegel's Concept On Civil Society

Hegel proposes it, should be understood by an individual before the social question of the multiform of cultures.

Treatment of *Bildung* in the context of social integration in a multi-cultural society will eventually involve critical reflection on Hegel's starting point, that is, man's realization as a human rational being in raising up his particularity, separating himself from nature and immediacy and overcoming them according to the order of rationality.¹⁶⁸ Precisely, realizing itself in order to be recognized by others in society is really a human task as a citizen, because society is the objective field of what is particular and subjective through recognition, legality or illegality, and being known by others.¹⁶⁹ This full realization in the modern – industrial society occasions enormous social problems. In this case, *Bildung* means also civilization, that is, what Hegel calls people's participation in social life, in order that every moment of civil society, therefore, becomes that of civilizing people.

In the case of social change that results from immigration, *Bildung* is still relevant today. In *Bildung*, an individual educates or exercises himself rationally in order to

¹⁶⁸ Cfr. AVINERI, SHLOMO, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 88 – 89.

¹⁶⁹ Cfr. P.R., 132.

be capable of getting true knowledge and adaptation with every new social circumstance. Through *Bildung*, an individual separates himself from his particularities, but at the same time he finds himself in his appropriation of subjectivity by raising up those particularities.¹⁷⁰ It means he becomes mature when facing every social change he finds in his society.

In this rational, reflective, and social capacity of individual reason, conclusively, there is no longer the outcast in society.¹⁷¹

3.2.2. The Question of Poverty

The modern society that Hegel wants to depict is economically productive, as it has the full participation of every member in it to increase the accumulation of the general resources. Hegel proposes that the civilizing process through increasing or augmenting an individual's possibility of sharing his education and skills in order that the universal and general resource is increased too.

¹⁷⁰ Cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, *Op.Cit.*, 90. P.R., 187.

¹⁷¹ Cfr. P.R., 209.

Chapter Three

Proposing Some Reflective Questions And Tentative Conclusions On Bildung As The Important Element Of Hegel's Concept On Civil Society

On the one hand, it is the conception of society which measures society economically. On the other, the individual's good is found in his ability to apply his education and skills to the general and universal resources. This is the reciprocal relationship between particularity and universality, in which society obtains its integral community.¹⁷² It is, thus, economically Hegel's view of the development of modern society.¹⁷³

Human work is personal and at the same time essential for human life, specifically for his living in society.¹⁷⁴ Having property, therefore, is important as the result of human work. Property itself is rational because human work itself is done by man as a human rational

¹⁷² Actually, it is the relevancy of the vocabulary of *Sittlichkeit*, in which there is a certain individual's identification with society, since society itself has represented individual ends. Or, in other words, individual ends and that of society are linked with. It is, actually, Hegelian concept in a temporary view of modern society. Cfr. CHARLES TAYLOR, *Op.Cit.*, 129 – 130.

¹⁷³ In order to maintain or keep its establishment, civil society must do an economical effort to an accumulation wealth, or universal and general resources. Cfr. P.R., 199, 243.

¹⁷⁴ Hegel's view of human work as the essential thing in human social life, actually, reflects what came about in the culture of society in 19th century. Human work is concerned immediately with his nature of rational being. The work therefore is human rational achievement to appropriate nature to him. Working becomes the means of human rational being to get his appropriation with nature, in which an individual is externalized himself and, as a result, he confirms his essence in his objective existence in the world. Hegel, thus, sees human rational working as man's formation in the world, separating himself, and turning back to himself in a higher stage, that is, reconciling with nature. Cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, *Op.Cit.*, 90 – 91. KARL LÓWTH, *Op.Cit.*, 391, 396 – 397.

being.¹⁷⁵ It means, therefore, that to lack property is to lack the result of man's capacity as a rational being to appropriate nature to himself.

Poverty is consequently the other side of Hegel's conception of the developing society which is based on the economic system of needs. Poverty is the degradation of society in its process of civilization.¹⁷⁶ Hegel also has assumed poverty as a subjective disposition of the lazy, vicious, barbarian, clumsy man.¹⁷⁷

Hegel divides social class in accordance with his speculative philosophical theory of concept¹⁷⁸; they are the substantial or immediate class (agricultural class), the reflecting or formal class (business class), and universal class (the class of civil servants).¹⁷⁹ Meanwhile, Hegel claims to undergird his conception of civil society on the interdependency of the social – economic welfare in the system of needs and work. He does not include the working

¹⁷⁵ Cfr. P.R., 196, 218. SHLOMO AVINERI, *Op.Cit.*, 88, 148 – 149.

¹⁷⁶ Cfr. P.R., 241.

¹⁷⁷ Cfr. P.R., 241, and addition to paragraph 197.

¹⁷⁸ Cfr. P.R., 21. In this paragraph, Hegel confirms his ontological vision of universe as self – manifesting Spirit through human mind. By this speculative ontological vision, he wants to underlie all his philosophical explanation including his social class division of civil society. He says that, in his speculative theory, the principle of right, morality, and ethics, is constituted and understood only in the course of the history of Concept. It is Concept which comprehends itself as essence through thought and divests itself of the untrue and contingency.

¹⁷⁹ Cfr. P.R., 202 – 204.

or labourer class in his depiction of civil society. Meanwhile, Hegel emphasizes the reciprocal satisfaction of needs through the social interdependence of each on all in interconnecting work¹⁸⁰, he makes the working class or labourers to be outcasts from the process of civilization.

Strictly speaking, the process of civilization with its emphasis on the individual self – sufficiency in the linked economic system, does not belong to the working class. In connection with the question of immigration which I have mentioned in a previous section, then, this is a serious omission of Hegel's class division.¹⁸¹ If the working class in modern – industrial society is not included as part of the existent social class, while their work has increased the general income, the labourer will be the real outcast of Civil Society. Consequently, there will be a serious threat of poverty.

The problem of poverty, therefore, remains open to us. The difficulty in applying Hegel's conception of *Bildung* to the recent industrial-social problems of poverty is found in the social fact that in a modern – industrial society, there are many poor people who have no fixed family. There are street boys, homeless, and nomads. Industrial society has

¹⁸⁰ Cfr. P.R., 199.

¹⁸¹ Cfr. JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW ARATO, *Op.Cit.*, 98 – 99.

caused the traffic of men who come from varied social and cultural origins, as I have mentioned in the previous section of immigration. It is actually the reality of cosmopolitan society which bears the lack of the Hegelian concept of a unified family as the ground of *Bildung* itself, without which there is no primary self-education in spiritual and particular form.¹⁸²

3.3. Tentative Conclusion

3.3.1. *Bildung* as the Means of the Individual and Social Integration in History

Talking about the necessity of *Bildung* in Hegel's depiction of Civil Society, it is important to know how it is conceptually connected with Hegel's ontological vision of the universe. The universe, or precisely the totality of the universe, is the larger life in which every individual exists, lives, and self – actualizes. The guarantee of this vision is the life of Spirit itself. Spirit is self – actualizing or self – expressing in the objective world in order to both oppose or

¹⁸² This lack of individual's ground of the proper existence in a unified family also means that there is not a kind of building individual's consciousness regards with the primary, divine, and obligating factor. It means as well that Hegel's starting point of universal interdependence in civil society is deprived of individual's self-sufficiency in its basic sense of family. Cfr. P.R., 181.

Chapter Three

Proposing Some Reflective Questions And Tentative Conclusions On Bildung As The Important Element Of Hegel's Concept On Civil Society

separate with itself and at the same time appropriate itself. It is Spirit's process of self – dialog in the objective world towards a higher and higher stage of maturity. Because of this vision, the totality of the universe is not the *status quo*, rather it grows up towards its maturity. This process comes about in the plan of rationality. This plan makes the world become more and more scientific according to the rational order.

That plan of rationality actually takes place in man because man is a rational being. It is *Bildung* in which man exercises his reason to develop objective reality in the order of a scientific plan of rationality. *Bildung*, therefore, is a human rational being in history. History is the development of the scientific Idea in which man as a human rational being has an indispensable role through *Bildung*.

History of concrete societies is that of *Sittlichkeit* itself by means of redefinition and reinterpretation. It is, thus, the human mind's role, through *Bildung*, in history.

3.3.2. *Bildung* as Human Reason's Capability of Communication

The three terms of history are purpose, standard, and progression. The world's history has a certain purpose. In order to obtain that purpose, it needs an adequate standard. As long as a standard is adequate, a certain epoch of history can obtain its purpose, and so much more progressive will a certain society be. All this happens through *Bildung*.

Human reason can be valid and recognized objectively by others in a relationship to a certain social system. Human reason is not closed in itself without any surrounding context. Reason is in relation and communication with an interconnected social system. This social and communicational dimension of human reason is only possible because it has the capability of cultivating, reflecting, and transforming whatever is immediate and natural to become an understandable form.

This communicational dimension of human reason is really the power of man in history to build a rational society. This communicational – rational capacity of human reason must be the guarantee of man's dignity in history without being restricted by racialism, primordial-exclusive

spirit among tribes, or the colour of skin. It is man as the proper subject who makes history, since every individual as a human rational being has authority in himself according to his power of reason. This human reason's capability is individual and at the same time social.

Human reason's capability of communicating itself to the others must be able to resolve the conflict of traditions in a multicultural society as I have proposed in previous sections as the social problem of the modern – industrial society.

3.3.3. Living in Society as a kind of Classroom of *Bildung*

In order to achieve his ends, an individual needs others both in social form and in freedom. We have seen that this needs *Bildung*. In the individual's hard process of *Bildung*, therefore, individual, society, and freedom are the indispensable demands. These three important elements above can only exist together in accordance with the order of rationality itself. Meanwhile, the plan of rationality in a modern – industrial world is no longer found in the sense of the Hegelian cosmic Spirit, but in the order of rationality

itself in an existent society. Shortly, such an order can be found only in historically existent social life.

Living in Civil Society, then, becomes a kind of **classroom** in which each must learn how to live in the spirit of togetherness under the guidance of authoritative reason. It lays out a series of historically human experiences that man cultivates his rational and conceptual acquisition of every worldly object.¹⁸³ Man's history in society becomes that of gaining self-consciousness through the interaction of subject – object including social and communicational relationships.

Living in society is also the classroom to learn to achieve every possible equilibration between maintaining a required and established social system and keeping attentive to the people's spirit. Trying to keep such an equilibration means continuing *Bildung* in society. In other words, in society, both social and individual reality should become more and more an adequate necessary process of human life to be scientific and rational.

Finally, while Hegel's ontological foundation of the self – actualizing Spirit as the cosmic world soul becomes difficult to understand in modern – industrial society,

¹⁸³ Cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, *Op.Cit.*, 132.

Chapter Three

Proposing Some Reflective Questions And Tentative Conclusions On Bildung As The Important Element Of Hegel's Concept On Civil Society

Hegel's proposal of *Bildung* is still relevant in today's life, in order that life itself becomes something to learn, self – educate, self – cultivate, and self – form. And to pass such a *Bildung*, living with others in close communication is indispensable, in order that life may proceed progressively in accordance with the order of the human – reflective – rational being itself.

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